




DAVID HORTON† & REID KRESS WEISBORD†† 
For more than 150 years, companies called “heir hunters” have operated in the 
shadows of the court system. Heir hunters monitor probate filings to identify intestate 
decedents who have missing or unknown relatives. They then perform genealogical 
research, locate the decedent’s kin, and offer to inform them about their inheritance 
rights in exchange for a share of the property. States are sharply divided about whether 
to enforce contracts between heir hunters and heirs. This discord stems from the fact 
that we know virtually nothing about heir hunting. 
This Article illuminates this mysterious corner of succession law by reporting the 
results of the first empirical study of heir hunting. Its centerpiece is a hand-collected 
dataset of 1,349 recent probate matters from San Francisco County, California. 
The Article reaches three main conclusions. First, heir hunting is a booming 
business. Indeed, the Article unearths 219 agreements between heir hunters and heirs 
from twenty-seven American states and eleven foreign countries. Second, heir 
hunting can be socially valuable. Heir hunters sometimes locate long-lost relatives 
after everyone else has failed. Third, heir hunting is also problematic. For one, the 
Article’s multivariate regression analysis reveals that cases with heir hunters are 
especially likely to devolve into litigation. In addition, heir hunters usually pay for 
the heir’s attorney, thus creating a stark conflict of interest. Finally, heir hunters 
charge exorbitant fees and routinely contact heirs before the administrator has even 
tried to locate them. Using these insights, the Article critiques existing approaches to 
heir hunting and suggests reforms that would enable the legal system to harness the 
practice’s benefits while limiting its costs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On January 25, 2016, Henry Imperial died intestate in San Francisco, 
California.1 His property was worth more than $425,000, but none of his 
relatives came forward to claim it.2 Thus, on April 29, the Public 
Administrator—an agency that handles the cases of decedents who have no 
apparent kin—filed a petition in probate court to administer Henry’s estate.3 
 
1 Petition for Letters of Admin. at 1-2, Est. of Imperial, No. PES-16-299740 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
filed Apr. 29, 2016). 
2 See id. at 4 (listing Henry as having “[n]o known heirs”); Ord. for Final Distrib., Settling 
First & Final Acct. & Rep. of Status of Admin. of the S.F. Pub. Adm’r, As Adm’r of the Est.; for 
Allowance of Statutory Att’y’s and Adm’r’s Comp.; for Approval of Assignments at 3, Est. of 
Imperial, No. PES-16-299740 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Nov. 13, 2018) [hereinafter Imperial, Order for 
Final Distribution] (calculating the value of Henry’s estate to be $425,783.02). 
3 Petition for Letters of Admin., supra note 1, at 1; see also Public Administrator, CITY & CNTY. 
OF S.F. HUM. SERVS. AGENCY, https://www.sfhsa.org/services/care-support/public-administrator 
[https://perma.cc/TW56-8Y5H] (“When a San Francisco resident dies and there are no family 
members able or willing to take care of his or her affairs, the Office of the Public Administrator will 
manage the estate.”). 
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One day later, the phone rang in Hal Imperial’s house in Oak Run, a rural 
area north of Sacramento.4 The caller told Hal that if he was Henry’s son, he 
“would be entitled to a beneficial interest in [Henry’s] estate, but only if he 
acted immediately.”5 The caller said that he would send paperwork that Hal 
needed to sign and return as soon as possible.6 Hal, whose poor health 
prevented him from working, followed the caller’s instructions.7 On May 3, 
he signed a contract with a company called American Research Bureau 
(ARB).8 ARB promised to help Hal obtain his inheritance in return for an 
assignment of twenty-five percent of his share of the property.9 On May 6, 
Hal’s brother, Robert Imperial, a laborer who lived thirty-five miles east of 
San Francisco, signed the same agreement with ARB.10 
Yet Hal and Robert did not need ARB’s assistance. On May 23, three 
weeks after the phone call, the probate court granted the Public 
Administrator’s petition to be appointed administrator of Henry’s estate.11 
Like all administrators, the agency owed a duty to try to find Henry’s heirs.12 
The Public Administrator would have had little difficulty locating Hal and 
Robert, who shared Henry’s surname and lived in the same geographic area. 
But by each signing away a quarter of their birthright to ARB, Hal and Robert 
forfeited a total of $100,000.13 
*** 
 
4 Declaration of Robert C. Imperial in Support of Objection to First & Final Acct. & Rep. of 
Status of Admin. of the S.F. Pub. Adm’r as Adm’r of Est. & Petition for Settlement Thereof at 2, In 




7 See id. at 3 (“We believed that we had to act quickly in order to be entitled to an interest in 
the estate and we did not have any time to get independent legal advice.”). 
8 Agreements & Assignments at 2, Est. of Imperial, No. PES-16-299740 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed 
June 10, 2016). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 3. 
11 Ord. Appointing Adm’r/Adm’x at 1, Est. of Imperial, No. PES-16-299740 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
May 23, 2016). 
12 See, e.g., Leighton v. Hallstrom, 114 N.E.3d 95, 102 (Mass. App. Ct. 2018) (“[I]t is a ‘basic 
responsibility of the probate judge and of the administrator’ to identify a decedent’s heirs.”) (citing 
cases); Roberts v. Robert, 158 P.3d 899, 903 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (“A diligent search and inquiry 
for heirs is all that is required . . . .”); accord In re Est. of Johnston, Jr., No. 110827, 1997 WL 599519, 
at *2 (Del. Ch. July 17, 1997) (describing the personal representative’s duty to identify heirs); In re 
Est. of Alexander, 758 A.2d 182, 187 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (same); Hesthagen v. Harby, 481 P.2d 438, 
443 (Wash. 1971) (same). 
13 First & Final Acct. & Rep. of Status of Admin. of the S.F. Pub. Adm’r, as Adm’r of the Est., 
& Petition for the Settlement Thereof at 6, Est. of Imperial, No. PES-16-299740 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
filed May 9, 2018). 
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Rosemary Elizabeth Poston died intestate in San Francisco on May 9, 
2016.14 Her property, worth $2,000,000, was going to pass to her three 
surviving children.15 Her sons, Michael and Robert, lived nearby and were 
handling her estate, but her daughter, Laurie Montoya, had long been 
estranged from the family.16 Montoya had even lost contact with her own 
children.17 Michael and Robert were unable to notify Montoya of the probate 
proceeding.18 As a result, they filed a Declaration of Diligent Search with the 
court, explaining that they had examined telephone directories and records 
from jails, probation offices, and hospitals, but had no “current information 
on [Montoya’s] whereabouts.”19 
This document captured the interest of Michael Heath, the President of 
Trust and Estate Search LLC (TES).20 Using his company’s proprietary 
database, Heath discovered Montoya’s Social Security number and former 
address.21 He then hired Ed Kelly, a private investigator, to “hit the streets” 
and find Montoya.22 Health gave Kelly a letter to present to Montoya that 
described his business: 
Trust & Estate Search has located money to which we believe you are 
entitled. 
We make our living locating missing people and unclaimed assets. For 
the work and expense of locating such assets and the rightful 
beneficiaries, we enter into an agreement with such people to be paid 
only from a portion of the asset that we have located for them. 
We are trying to get money to you that we believe is rightfully yours; 
we are not, and will not, ask for money from you.23 
Heath also asked Kelly to give Montoya a “gift” of $1,000 and a 
contract to sign.24 
 
14 Petition for Letters of Admin. at 1-2, In re Est. of Poston, No. PES-16-299983 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. filed July 13, 2016). 
15 Id. at 2-5. 
16 Declaration of Diligent Search, & Request to Dispense with Notice at 2, In re Est. of Poston, 
No. PES-16-299983 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 13, 2016). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 2-3. 
20 Declaration of Michael Heath Regarding Efforts Undertaken to Locate Missing Heir at 1, 3, In re 
Est. of Poston, No. PES-16-299983 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Dec. 6, 2017) [hereinafter Heath Declaration]. 
21 Id. at 3. 
22 Id. 
23 Declaration of Ed Kelly Regarding Efforts Undertaken to Locate Missing Heir at 8, In re Est. 
of Poston, No. PES-16-299983 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Dec. 6, 2017) [hereinafter Kelly Declaration]. 
24 Id. at 3; Heath Declaration, supra note 20, at 3-4. 
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Kelly tracked down Montoya on skid row in San Francisco.25 He allegedly 
told Montoya that he worked for her family, but that they did not want her 
to contact them.26 Montoya claims that Kelly presented her with a one-page 
document that, he told her, would pass her share of Poston’s estate to 
Montoya’s children, allegedly offering her $1000 to sign.27 Montoya did not 
have her reading glasses, but she trusted Kelly, accepted the offer, and took 
the cash.28 But as Montoya later discovered, the document actually assigned 
29%—totaling more than $111,000—of her inheritance to TES.29 
 

























25 Kelly Declaration, supra note 23, at 2. 
26 Declaration of Laurie Elizabeth Montoya at 2, In re Est. of Poston, No. PES-16-299983 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. filed Dec. 6, 2017) [hereinafter Montoya Declaration]. 
27 Id. Kelly’s version of events is different. He contends that he told Montoya that he worked 
for a “forensic genealogy firm” and that “she was entitled to some valuable assets that might be lost 
to her if she did not appear to claim them.” Kelly Declaration, supra note 23, at 2. In addition, Kelly 
asserts that Montoya read the contract before signing it. Id. 
28 See Montoya Declaration, supra note 26, at 2. 
29 Id. at 3; Proposed Statement of Decision at 6-7, In re Est. of Poston, No. PES-16-299983 
(Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 5, 2018). 
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In 1995, Carlos Colson died in San Francisco.30 The Public Administrator 
opened a probate case, but could not find Colson’s kin.31 In 1997, Colson’s 
mother, Evangelina Osorno Menchaca, came out of the woodwork to claim 
his estate.32 Then, just as quickly as Menchaca had emerged, she vanished.33 
For two decades, Colson’s property sat in limbo, on the verge of escheating 
to the state.34 
 
30 Declaration of Paul Elissiry of Est. Rsch. Assocs. Regarding the Heirs of Evangelina Osorno 
Menchaca at 2, In re Est. of Menchaca, No. PES-16-300225 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 17, 2017) 
[hereinafter Elissiry Declaration]. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 See id. (noting that, despite the filing of Menchaca’s heirship affidavit in 1997, the Colson 
estate remained undistributed as of 2010). 
34 Escheat is “seizure by the state of property which has no owner.” David C. Auten, Note, 
Modern Rationales of Escheat, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 96 (1963). In California, the Attorney General 
must file a petition seeking to capture unclaimed assets. See Bogert v. Davis, 263 Cal. Rptr. 129, 130 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (“The state must institute proceedings to establish its rights in [unclaimed] 
 
v 
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Meanwhile, Estate Research Associates (ERA) was monitoring the 
Colson case and searching for Menchaca. In 2016, ERA discovered that 
Menchaca had died intestate in Mexico City some two decades prior, leaving 
six grandchildren who did not realize that they were entitled to inherit 
Colson’s assets through Menchaca.35 ERA sold Menchaca’s grandchildren this 
information.36 Then, in a fourty-five page court filing, ERA produced 
nineteen exhibits—passports, birth and death certificates, and genealogical 
charts—that proved its clients’ relationships to Colson.37 For its services, 
ERA collected 33% of each grandchild’s inheritance, for a total of $68,126.38 
*** 
Companies like ARB, TES, and ERA have deep roots in the Anglo-
American probate system. Since the 1850s, these “heir hunters” have 
intervened in cases with unclaimed inheritances.39 Heir hunters employ a 
business model that has remained virtually unchanged since the industry’s 
inception. They start by finding decedents whose estates have yet to be 
distributed.40 Then they perform research to identify the decedent’s heirs, 
contact these individuals, and offer to reveal the relevant facts about the case 
and to help them collect in court.41 In return, heir hunters ask for an 
assignment of a percentage of the heirs’ recovery.42 
Although heir hunting is pervasive, it has flown beneath the scholarly 
radar.43 This inattention is surprising. In the past decade, there has been fierce 
 
property.”). In the two decades that Colson’s case sat idle, all that stood between his estate and 
escheat was the filing of such a lawsuit. 
35 Elissiry Declaration, supra note 30, at 2-3. 
36 Id. at 3. 
37 Id. at 1-45. 
38 Ord. for Final Distrib., Settling First & Final Acct. & Rep. of Adm’r at 4-5, In re Est. of 
Menchaca, No. PES-16-300225 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed June 12, 2017). 
39 See infra text accompanying notes 74–77. 
40 See infra text accompanying note 74. Heir hunters typically focus on intestate decedents 
(those that have no will). However, some testators leave property to amorphous classes, such as “my 
heirs at law.” Gertsch v. Int’l Equity Rsch. (In re Est. of Katze-Miller), 463 N.W.2d 853, 855 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1990). Heir hunters occasionally target these individuals if they are not aware of their 
status as beneficiaries. See, e.g., id. at 855-57 (informing indivdiauls of their potential status as heirs 
or owners of interest). 
41 See infra text accompanying notes 76–77. 
42 See infra text accompanying notes 76–77. 
43 Heir hunting is probably best-known as the subject of a popular British television show. See 
Heir Hunters, BBC, https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b007nms5 [https://perma.cc/S9P8-ZQ44] 
(“Series following the work of heir hunters, probate detectives looking for distant relatives of people 
who have died without making a will.”). In addition, heir hunting briefly flickered in the public 
mind in 2019, when the Department of Justice announced that a leading firm, Kemp & Associates, 
had pled guilty to antitrust violations. Heir Location Services Company and Co-Owner Plead Guilty To 
Antitrust Charge for Long-Running Agreement Not to Compete, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (July 10, 2019), 
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debate about third party litigation funders: businesses that invest in pending 
claims.44 The ancient doctrine of champerty once barred outsiders from 
encouraging “strife and contention” by buying an interest in a complaint.45 
However, champerty has fallen from favor in some jurisdictions, allowing 
companies to advance cash to plaintiffs in return for a cut of any future 
damages or settlement.46 Dozens of commentators disagree about whether 
litigation funding facilitates access to justice,47 exploits consumers,48 or 
encourages litigation.49 But that vast literature has overlooked heir hunting, 
which established the prototype for litigation funding and raises nearly 




44 Compare, e.g., JOHN BEISNER, JESSICA MILLER & GARY RUBIN, U.S. CHAMBER INST. 
FOR LEGAL REFORM, SELLING LAWSUITS, BUYING TROUBLE: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION 
FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2009) [hereinafter SELLING LAWSUITS] (“If such funding 
becomes more prevalent, it will pose substantial risks of litigation abuse.”), with Marc J. Shukaitis, 
A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329, 329 (1987) (“Allowing victims to sell 
their claims to third parties, that is, allowing a market in personal injury tort claims, would have 
significant advantages for tort victims.”). For other perspectives on this debate, see generally David 
S. Abrams & Daniel L. Chen, A Market for Justice: A First Empirical Look at Third Party Litigation 
Funding, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1075 (2013); Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 
114 YALE L.J. 697 (2005); Ronen Avraham & Anthony Sebok, An Empirical Investigation of Third 
Party Consumer Litigant Funding, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 1133 (2019); Susan Lorde Martin, The 
Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance Should Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM 
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55 (2004) [hereinafter Martin, Wild West]; Susan Lorde Martin, Litigation 
Financing: Another Subprime Industry that Has a Place in the United States Market, 53 VILL. L. REV. 83 
(2008); Jonathan T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (2009); Anthony J. 
Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61 (2011); Austin T. Popp, Note, Federal Regulation 
of Third-Party Litigation Finance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 727 (2019); Anthony J. Sebok, Should the Law 
Preserve Party Control? Litigation Investment, Insurance Law, and Double Standards, 56 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 833 (2015); Maya Steinitz & Abigail C. Field, A Model Litigation Finance Contract, 99 IOWA 
L. REV. 711 (2014); Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 1268 (2011) [hereinafter Steinitz, Whose Claim?]; Maya Steinitz, Incorporating Legal 
Claims, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1155 (2015) [hereinafter Steinitz, Incorporating Claims]; 
Matthathias Schwartz, Should You Be Allowed to Invest in a Lawsuit?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 
22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/magazine/should-you-be-allowed-to-invest-in-
a-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/2RGF-5VYM]. 
45 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134-35 (1860). 
46 See Steinitz, Whose Claim?, supra note 44, at 1278-82 (discussing the abolition of champerty 
in Australia and the United Kingdom). 
47 See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, Investors Put Money on Lawsuits to Get Payouts, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
14, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/15/business/15lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/VDH6-3SQC] 
(explaining that plaintiffs can use litigation loans to hone their evidence and hire top-flight experts). 
48 See, e.g., Jean Xiao, Note, Heuristics, Biases, and Consumer Litigation Funding at the Bargaining 
Table, 68 VAND. L. REV. 261, 268 (2015) (noting worries about litigation funders “exploit[ing] 
consumers by charging exorbitant fees”). 
49 See, e.g., SELLING LAWSUITS, supra note 44, at 4 (accusing litigation funders of “increas[ing] 
the overall litigation volume”). 
50 See infra subsection I.B.4. 
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on litigation funding, only two student notes—one from 1953 and the other 
from 1991—have addressed heir hunting.51 
In addition, the scholarly neglect of heir hunting is unfortunate because 
the rules that govern the practice are wildly unsettled. Originally, many heir 
hunters were scam artists who chased down known heirs before news of the 
decedent’s death arrived through normal channels.52 Courts invalidated these 
companies’ assignments for champerty53 or deemed their pseudo-legal 
services to be the unauthorized practice of law.54 But starting in the 1990s, 
the pendulum began to swing in the other direction. Some judges departed 
from traditional doctrine and enforced heir hunting contracts,55 finding that 
they confer “a substantial benefit”56 and “provide the only means by which 
those entitled to unclaimed property might learn of their entitlement.”57 That 
trend generated a sharp split in authority over “[w]hether heir hunters should 
be viewed as ‘self-serving intermeddlers’ or the providers of ‘useful and 
necessary service[s].’”58 
This Article sharpens our understanding of heir hunting by reporting the 
results of the first empirical study of the industry. The Article’s centerpiece 
is an original dataset of 1,349 probate filings from San Francisco County, 
California between 2014 and 2016. The Golden State allows heir hunters to 
collect directly from the estate if a probate court finds that their assignments 
are fair.59 As a result, heir hunters routinely file their agreements in the public 
 
51 Frank C. Ingraham, Note, Heir-Hunting—A Profession or a Racket?, 7 VAND. L. REV. 104 
(1953); Allan Friedman, Note, Heir-Hunting Agreements: Recommendations for the Extension of Probate 
Court Jurisdiction, 6 CONN. PROB. L.J. 87 (1991). One of us has written about a related industry 
called “probate lending.” David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, Probate Lending, 126 YALE 
L.J. 102 (2016). Probate lenders are a hybrid of payday lenders and heir hunters: they pay cash 
advances to heirs and beneficiaries in return for an assignment of a much larger sum payable from 
the distribution of the estate. Id. at 125; see also David Horton, Borrowing in the Shadow of Death: 
Another Look at Probate Lending, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2447, 2472-73 (2018) (further discussing 
this litigation model). Probate lenders do not locate heirs and thus raise “discrete issue[s].” Horton 
& Chandrasekher, supra, at 107 n.18. 
52 See infra text accompanying notes 93–97. 
53 See, e.g., Merlaud v. Nat’l Metro. Bank of Wash., D.C., 84 F.2d 238, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1936) 
(“[I]f this be not champerty, we fail to see wherein there can be champerty.” (quoting Peck v. 
Heurich, 167 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1897))); see also infra text accompanying notes 104–07. 
54 See, e.g., Butler v. Cox (In re Butler’s Est.), 177 P.2d 16, 18 (Cal. 1947) (accusing an heir hunter 
of taking “complete control of litigation” and “intervening for profit in the conduct of legal 
proceedings”); see also infra text accompanying notes 109–15. 
55 See, e.g., Nelson v. McGoldrick, 896 P.2d 1258, 1266 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (finding that no 
public policy requires the invalidation of heir hunting contracts); see also infra text accompanying 
notes 127–29, 132–35, 138–42. 
56 Gertsch v. Int’l Equity Rsch. (In re Est. of Katze-Miller), 463 N.W.2d 853, 861 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). 
57 Nelson, 896 P.2d at 1266. 
58 In re Est. of Campbell, 742 A.2d 639, 640 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1999) (quoting Friedman, 
supra note 51, at 87). 
59 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 11604 (West 2020). 
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record. This disclosure norm enabled us to unearth 219 agreements from 
twenty-seven American states and eleven foreign countries that generated 
more than $1.5 million in heir hunting fees. 
We use this evidence to critique existing regulation of heir hunting and 
propose reforms. First, we argue that the conventional approach of voiding 
heir hunting contracts for champerty is defensible but imperfect. Some courts 
apply champerty to prevent heir hunters from causing or exacerbating 
probate conflicts,60 and our logit regression analysis suggests that estates with 
heir hunters are especially likely to devolve into litigation. Similarly, other 
judges invoke champerty to “protect[] beneficiaries of estates 
from . . . unnecessary expense.”61 We show that these consumer protection 
concerns are well-founded. Heir hunters often preempt the administrator’s 
efforts to locate the decedent’s kin.62 Like ARB, which contacted Hal and 
Robert Imperial just one day after their father’s probate case began,63 the vast 
majority of heir hunters in our data secure contracts before the court even 
appoints an administrator. By intruding so early in the process, heir hunters 
provide an unnecessary “service.” However, champerty, which effectively bars 
heir hunting, would also prevent heir hunters from helping heirs who are 
genuinely unaware of their inheritance rights. For instance, in the Colson and 
Menchaca estates, ERA solved a decades-old genealogical conundrum and 
ensured that assets remained within the decedent’s family.64 Because 
champerty would eliminate both the costs and the benefits of heir hunting, it 
provides a blunt response to a multidimensional problem. 
Second, we contend that heir hunting is a fertile source of ethical 
problems. Our research reveals that the same lawyer often represents both 
the heir hunter and the heirs in a single case.65 This creates a grave conflict of 
interest. Indeed, as one court has observed, an attorney representing an heir 
hunter cannot render unbiased legal advice to the heir about whether “the 
heir hunter’s assignment is suspect or unreasonable.”66 Moreover, although 
some courts have banned dual representation,67 we discover that heir hunters 
have managed to slip around this rule. By funneling heirs to “industry 
lawyers”—ostensibly “independent” counsel who, in fact, routinely represent 
 
60 See infra text accompanying notes 104–07, 125–26, 130–32. 
61 Carey v. Thieme, 64 A.2d 394, 399 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1949). 
62 See infra subsection III.A.1.b. 
63 See supra text accompanying notes 4–10. 
64 See Elissiry Declaration, supra note 30, at 3 (“ERA accomplished what no one else was able 
to do since Colson died over 20 years ago.”). 
65 See infra Section III.B. 
66 Gunning v. Caudill (Est. of Wright), 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 572, 578 (Ct. App. 2001). 
67 See infra text accompanying notes 144–54. 
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heir hunters—they comply with the law on paper while still retaining total 
dominion over the proceeding. 
Finally, we synthesize our findings into a proposal for legislation that 
tightens the reins on heir hunters. We argue that states should pass statutes 
that cap heir hunting fees and impose a moratorium on the solicitation of 
heirs until after the administrator has had an opportunity to try to find the 
decedent’s family. We demonstrate that these interventions would reduce the 
litigation rate, prevent heir hunters from exploiting their clients, and lower 
the stakes for heirs with disloyal lawyers. 
The Article contains three Parts. Part I traces the evolution of heir 
hunting from Victorian England to contemporary America. It reveals that, 
initially, most courts refused to enforce agreements between heir hunters and 
heirs. Yet it also shows that this resistance ebbed over the decades, creating 
confusion about the legality of heir hunting. Part II describes our empirical 
methodology and general findings. Part III excavates deeper into our data to 
assess the existing legal framework and prescribe policy recommendations. 
I. THE HISTORY OF HEIR HUNTING 
This Part describes the history of heir hunting. It reveals that courts in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries viewed heir hunting with “very 
considerable suspicion.”68 Yet it also demonstrates that modern judges have 
become less skeptical of the practice, sowing confusion about whether and 
how to regulate the industry. 
A. Early Hostility 
Since ancient Rome, courts have invalidated contracts in which a third 
party interferes with someone else’s legal proceeding. The doctrine of 
maintenance prohibits “officious intermeddling in a [law]suit that no way 
belongs to one . . . .”69 More specifically, champerty, a species of maintenance, 
applies when an outsider agrees “to carry on [another] party’s [claim] at his 
own expense.”70 
 
68 Proceedings Affecting the Profession, 36 IRISH L. TIMES & SOLICS.’ J. 457, 460 (1902). 
69 BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at *134-35. 
70 Id. at *135; see also WILLIAM JOHN TAPP, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRESENT STATE OF THE 
LAW OF MAINTENANCE AND CHAMPERTY 20-21 (1861) (“[A]ll champerty is maintenance, though 
all maintenance is not champerty; the one being the genus and the other the species.”). Courts also 
invalidated attempted assignments of choses in action: intangible property rights, such as pending 
causes of action. See, e.g., Walter Wheeler Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action, 29 HARV. L. 
REV. 816, 816 (1916) (“[A]ccording to the original common law rule . . . a chose in action was not 
assignable.”(emphasis omitted)). 
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Supposedly, champerty serves two purposes. First, it prevents 
exploitation. Roman Emperor Anastasius, troubled by plaintiffs who were 
selling claims for “far below their value,” banned the practice in 506 A.D.71 
Second, judges believed that allowing parties to alienate their interest in a 
lawsuit would encourage litigation.72 Trials, in medieval society, were seen as 
“a dangerous instrumentality” that exhibited “a quarrelsome and un-Christian 
spirit.”73 By refusing to treat causes of action like other forms of property—
which can be freely transferred for consideration—champerty prevented claims 
from being commodified and the judicial system from becoming a market. 
But in 1850s England, a new kind of entrepreneur began to test 
champerty’s boundaries. Genealogists who called themselves “next-of-kin 
agents” began scouring probate filings for estates in which nobody had sought 
to inherit the decedent’s assets.74 Next-of-kin agents used their professional 
training to track down the decedent’s relatives and tantalize them with news 
that they stood to receive a substantial sum.75 Then, in return for a fraction 
of the estate, next-of-kin agents offered to identify the relevant probate 
matter and supply proof of the heirs’ genetic link to the decedent.76 If the 
heir did not recover, the next-of-kin agent also took nothing.77 
These fledging businesses raised novel legal questions. As noted, 
champerty nullified any contract in which a non-party promised to “carry 
on . . . litigation.”78 Yet next-of-kin agents were “skilled in the law of 
 
71 Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 55 (1935). Indeed, champerty’s 
etymology contains a subtle reference to the doctrine’s consumer protection rationale: the word 
“champerty” comes from “champart,” which refers to a property arrangement that permitted feudal 
landowners to exploit tenants without violating the usury laws. Id. at 61. 
72 See Lampert’s Case (1613) 77 Eng. Rep. 994, 997; 10 Co. Rep. 46 b, 48 a (predicting that the 
sale of lawsuits would lead to a “multiplying of contentions and suits”). 
73 Radin, supra note 71, at 58. 
74 For a few contemporary accounts of these “next-of-kin agents,” see generally Rees v. De Bernardy 
[1896] 2 Ch 437; Reynell v. Sprye (1852) 42 Eng. Rep. 710; 1 De G. M. & G. 660; Sprye v. Porter (1856) 
119 Eng. Rep. 1169; 7 El. & Bl. 57; Wedgerfield v. De Bernardy (1908) 24 TLR 497 (Eng.). See also Banking 
& Commercial Law, 51 BANKERS’ MAG. 842, 842 (1891) (mentioning a next-of-kin agent called Adams & 
Co., which had sought access to a list of unclaimed dividends from the Bank of England). 
75 See, e.g., Porter, 119 Eng. Rep. at 1178, 7 El. & Bl. at 80 (remarking upon an heir’s “ignorance 
of his being related to [the decedent] or in any way entitled to the property”). 
76 Id. 
77 See, e.g., Reynell, 42 Eng. Rep. at 722 (observing that an heir had agreed to “be[] indemnified 
against all costs whatever incurred in the attempt to recover [the property], whether that attempt 
should or should not prove successful”). 
78 Stanley v. Jones (1831) 131 Eng. Rep. 143, 146; 7 Bing. 369, 379. For instance, in Stanley, the 
British Court of Common Pleas invalidated a contract between the plaintiff and a witness who 
agreed to provide favorable evidence in exchange for one-eighth of the litigation proceeds. Id. at 
146-47; 7 Bing. at 377-79. The witness had promised to “exert his utmost influence and means for 
procuring such evidence as should be requisite to substantiate the [plaintiff ’s] claims.” Id. at 146; 7 
Bing. at 378. The court held that this personal stake in the outcome of the case made the agreement 
champertous. Id. at 146-47; 7 Bing. at 378-79. 
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champerty”79 and thus knew to maintain a plausible distance from the probate 
proceeding. For instance, they styled their written agreements as bare 
promises “to give information” rather than as commitments to corroborate the 
heir’s inheritance allegations in court.80 Some of these assignments further 
obfuscated the true nature of the next-of-kin agent’s services by stating that 
heirs did not need “to take any proceedings at law or in equity to recover the 
[] property.”81 Judges were rightly skeptical. Instead of accepting these 
transactions at face value, they scrutinized the record for clues that the next-
of-kin agent had orally agreed to help the heir prevail in probate.82 If the next-
of-kin agent had obtained the heir’s business by leading her to “believe that he 
would recover the property,” then the exchange was void for champerty.83 
Next-of-kin agents fought this conclusion tooth and nail. In particular, 
they contended that their transactions should be exempt from champerty 
because probate often functions as an administrative, non-adversarial 
proceeding.84 For example, the filing of an heirship petition—the vehicle for 
establishing inheritance rights in complex matters—only requires the court 
to adjudicate a dispute if another party objects.85 Thus, next-of-kin agents 
argued that they did not encourage “litigation” as that term is commonly 
understood.86 But courts disagreed, reasoning that champerty requires only 
the possibility that the probate proceedings “might have become . . . hostile.”87 
Eventually, next-of-kin agents started to appear in America. In 1902, 
Comfort, one of the most widely-circulated magazines of its time, ran a feature 
story that described next-of-kin agents as resourceful entrepreneurs. 
His library	.	.	.	comprises hundreds of old directories, domestic and 
foreign, old court guides, peerages, long records of births, marriages, 
and deaths	.	.	.	.	One next-of-kin agent has also a wonderful series of 
 
79 Rees, [1896] 2 Ch at 447. 
80 Id. 
81 Porter, 119 Eng. Rep. at 1169; 7 El. & Bl. At 58. 
82 See Rees, [1896] 2 Ch at 446 (analyzing the parties’ “true agreement”); Porter, 119 Eng. Rep. at 1178; 
7 El. & Bl. at 80 (“There can be no doubt that the [heir] is at liberty to allege that the written agreement 
declared upon was merely colourable, and to disclose, as a defence, the real nature of the transaction.”). 
83 Rees, [1896] 2 Ch at 447; see also Porter, 119 Eng. Rep. at 1178; 7 El. & Bl. at 81 (“The [next-
of-kin agent] purchase[d] an interest in the property in dispute, bargains for litigation to recover it, 
and undertakes to maintain the [heir] in the suit . . . . Upon principle such an agreement is clearly 
illegal . . . .”). Conversely, if there was no such side deal, the transaction stood. See Wedgerfield v. 
De Bernardy (1908) 24 TLR 497, 497 (Eng.) (“There is nothing illegal in a sale by one person to 
another of information likely . . . to lead to the recovery of property, and in an agreement to pay the 
person selling the information at share of the property if and when recovered.”). 
84 See Rees, [1896] 2 Ch at 442 (“A transaction such as this is not champerty or maintenance 
unless there is a certainty or probability of litigation . . . .”). 
85 See id. (“Here no one had an adverse interest. The title was clear. Litigation was improbable . . . .”). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 449 (emphasis added). 
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cards, millions of them, arranged in alphabetical order, so skillfully 
and comprehensively that it is hardly possible to name any man of the 
slightest consequence, providing he lived since 1750, about whom this 
remarkable reference library will not reveal something.88 
Shortly thereafter, an assortment of heir-finding firms sprung up around 
the country. For instance, in 1913, Walter C. Cox founded W.C. Cox & 
Company in Chicago.89 Cox had once helped life insurance executives track 
down missing beneficiaries, and he later expanded into “the more complicated 
arena of probate research nationwide.”90 Cox’s endeavors were so lucrative 
that his employees routinely broke away to establish rival firms.91 
These businesses soon became known as “heir hunter[s],”92 and acquired 
a reputation for unsavory practices. For one, instead of providing valuable 
genealogical research in estates plagued by long-lost relatives or complex 
family trees, heir hunters often targeted heirs regardless of whether they were 
on the administrator’s radar. One common scam preyed on the large 
population of immigrant decedents who still had ties overseas. 
[The heir hunter] had selected correspondents in England, Germany, 
Italy, France, Ireland, and other countries. As soon as he ascertained 
the name of a prospective beneficiary of an estate, his practice was to 
cable his correspondent abroad. That correspondent immediately 
solicited the beneficiary and obtained an agreement to represent him 
on the basis of a percentage of the legacy or share.93 
 
88 More than a Billion Dollars Awaiting Owners, COMFORT, Aug. 1902, at 13. For more on 
Comfort’s popularity, see DOROTHY STEWARD SAYWARD, COMFORT MAGAZINE, 1888-1942: A 
HISTORY AND CRITICAL STUDY i (1960). 
89 About the Company, W.C. COX & CO., http://www.wccox.com/about.html [https://perma.cc/65C5-
HT53] [hereinafter About the Company]. 
90 Id. 
91 See id. (“Many who would start their own research companies during the 1930s and 1940s 
began their careers under the expert tutelage of Walter C. Cox.”). 
92 Horan v. Varian, 268 P. 637, 637 (Cal. 1928). 
93 In re Lynch’s Est., 276 N.Y.S. 939, 942 (Sur. Ct. 1935). Lynch was not the only  decision 
involving deceased immigrants with family overseas. See, e.g., Merlaud v. Nat’l Metro. Bank of 
Washington, D.C., 84 F.2d 238, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (Australia); Carey v. Thieme, 64 A.2d 394, 395 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1949) (the U.K.); Butler v. Cox (In re Butler’s Est.), 177 P.2d 16, 17 (Cal. 
1947) (Ireland); In re Reilly’s Est., 184 P.2d 922, 924 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947) (same); In re 
Wellington’s Est., 276 N.Y.S. 946, 947 (Sur. Ct. 1935) (same); Foreman v. Gwirtz (In re Cohen’s 
Est.), 152 P.2d 485, 486 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944) (Russia). 
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Other heirs lived in the same city as the decedent94 or were her siblings95 or 
parents,96 rather than her distant relatives. In all of these cases, the heirs’ rights 
to receive property “would have been proven without [the firm’s] intervention.”97 
Other heir hunters smooth-talked their way into the probate system. For 
instance, in 1925, Joseph Woerndle and Henry Gordon formed the 
Transatlantic Estates & Credit Company in New York.98 Neither man had 
been admitted to the New York bar.99 Woerndle had been rejected four times, 
and Gordon’s education at “a correspondence law school in Kansas” had 
earned him a law license in Georgia, but not New York.100 Despite its 
principals’ lack of qualifications, Transatlantic represented approximately 
four hundred heirs in more than three hundred estates in Bronx, Kings, 
Queens, and Westchester Counties, “handl[ing] all the legal proceedings”101 
and charging fees as high as fifty percent of the value of the assets.102 
During this early period, American judges “almost uniformly refused to 
enforce [heir hunting] contracts.”103 Courts in the District of Columbia, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Ohio followed the English approach, 
holding that heir hunting contracts violated the champerty doctrine.104 
However, the logic of these opinions did not always align. Some courts 
faulted heir hunters for paying the heir’s legal expenses, a subsidy that 
encouraged the heir to pursue an heirship petition in probate court.105 We will 
 
94 E.g., McIlwain’s Est., 27 Pa. D. & C. 619, 623 (C.P. Phila. Cnty., Orphans’ Ct. Div.  1936) 
(“All of the [decedent’s] family [and the decedent] lived in Philadelphia, and it was inevitable, 
because of their proximity and close relationship, that sooner or later the news of his death would 
be communicated to them.”). 
95 E.g., Merrick v. Larson (In re Larson’s Est.), 206 P.2d 852, 854 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949) 
(sister); In re Cohen’s Est., 152 P.2d at 486 (brother). 
96 E.g., In re Lynch’s Est., 276 N.Y.S. at 943 (father and mother). 
97 In re Wellington’s Est., 276 N.Y.S. at 947; see also In re Reilly’s Est., 184 P.2d at 924 (explaining 
that an heir hunter’s client “was located in Ireland within eighteen days after the filing of the petition 
for letters of administration”). 
98 In re Lynch’s Est., 276 N.Y.S. at 941. 
99 Id. at 941-42. 
100 Id. at 941-42. 
101 In re Wellington’s Est., 276 N.Y.S. at 948; see also In re Lynch’s Est., 276 N.Y.S. at 942 
(providing more detail about the company). 
102 In re Lynch’s Est., 276 N.Y.S. at 941. 
103 Skinner v. Morrow, 318 S.W.2d 419, 429 (Ky. 1958). 
104 See Merlaud v. Nat’l Metro. Bank of Wash., D.C., 84 F.2d 238, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1936); 
Boettcher v. Criscione, 299 P.2d 806, 811 (Kan. 1956), opinion modified on reh’g, 305 P.2d 1055 (Kan. 
1957); McIlwain’s Est., 27 Pa. D. & C. 619, 624-25 (C.P. Phila. Cnty., Orphans’ Ct. Div. 1936); Skinner, 
318 S.W.2d at 429; In re Est. of Rice, 193 N.E.2d 566, 571 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1963). But see Sparne v. 
Altshuler, 90 A.2d 919, 923 (R.I. 1952) (rejecting argument that heir hunting “agreements were 
champertous in their nature, against public policy, and therefore illegal and void”); Pelton v. Witcher, 
319 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) (upholding heir hunting contract against fraud challenge). 
105 See, e.g., Merlaud, 84 F.2d at 240 (“[A]n agreement by an attorney at law to prosecute at his 
own expense a suit . . . in which he personally has and claims no title or interest in consideration of 
receiving a certain portion of what he may recover is unlawful and void for champerty.”). 
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call this the “litigiousness” theory of champerty. Another group of judges held 
that heir hunters thwarted the administrator’s duty to find the decedent’s family. 
[T]his Court will not tolerate, sanction or permit these self-appointed 
Lost Heir organizations to compete with duly appointed 
Administrators . . . of estates . . . . This Court is its own Clerk and has 
custody and jurisdiction over its files, papers, cases and records, and 
as such, does not intend to permit any self appointed person or 
organization to operate in open competition with duly appointed 
fiduciaries. Such activity is against public policy and borders on 
“ambulance chasing” . . . .106 
According to this view, heir hunters’ intermeddling prevented heirs from 
inheriting “in the usual course of the administration of the estate without any 
deductions for collection fees.”107 We will refer to this as the “interference” 
theory of champerty. 
Other states which have never recognized champerty nevertheless 
invalidated heir hunting contracts on other grounds.108 Courts in California, 
Florida, Louisiana, New Jersey, and New York held that heir hunters were 
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.109 To maximize the likelihood of 
recovering property, firms insisted that their clients sign powers of attorney 
that gave them “complete control” over the probate.110 Some of these 
documents were fatally flawed because they vested heir hunters with the right 
to perform “essentially legal services,”111 such as to “conduct or defend all 
litigation.”112 But even when these contracts merely allowed companies to hire 
counsel for heirs, they violated the prohibition on “running and capping” 
 
106 In re Est. of Rice, 193 N.E.2d at 569-70 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). 
107 Carey v. Thieme, 64 A.2d 394, 399 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1949). 
108 See, e.g., Foreman v. Gwirtz (In re Cohen’s Est.), 152 P.2d 485, 489 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1944) (“California is one of the many states that has never adopted the common law doctrines of 
champerty . . . .”); A ex rel. J. v. D., 482 A.2d 531, 534 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) (“[C]hamperty 
do[es] not prevail in New Jersey . . . .”). 
109 Butler v. Cox (In re Butler’s Est.), 177 P.2d 16, 18 (Cal. 1947); In re Reilly’s Est., 184 P.2d 
922, 924 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947); Fla. Bar v. Heller, 247 So. 2d 434, 436 (Fla. 1971); In re Root, 
249 P.2d 628, 630 (Kan. 1952); Dickey v. Kidd (Succession of Humes), 467 So. 2d 25, 29 (La. Ct. 
App. 1985); Carey, 64 A.2d at 398; In re Lynch’s Est., 276 N.Y.S. 939, 944 (Sur. Ct. 1935); In re 
Wellington’s Est., 276 N.Y.S. 946, 949 (Sur. Ct. 1935); In re Robinson’s Est., 275 N.Y.S.2d 337, 341 
(Sur. Ct. 1966), aff ’d in part, appeal dismissed in part sub nom. Parisi v. Bakerman (In re Est. of 
Robinson), 291 N.Y.S.2d 919 (App. Div. 1968); Estate of Rice, 193 N.E.2d at 571. 
110 In re Butler’s Est., 177 P.2d at 18-19 (nullifying contract where heir hunter obtained the power 
“to petition for letters of administration or letters testamentary, to recognize, defend or contest wills 
. . . [and] to institute, prosecute or defend suits and proceedings in law, equity or in probate”). 
111 In re Robinson’s Est., 275 N.Y.S.2d at 341. 
112 Carey, 64 A.2d at 396. 
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(non-lawyers drumming up business for attorneys).113 This rule recognizes 
that because lawyers are forbidden from soliciting clients, third parties should 
not be able to solicit clients for lawyers.114 Thus, when heir hunters funneled 
heirs to particular counsel, judges condemned them as “middlem[e]n 
intervening for profit in . . . legal proceedings.”115 
Finally, legislatures in California and New York passed statutes that 
governed heir hunting. In 1939, citing the “long history of overreaching in 
this field,”116 lawmakers in the Golden State passed what is now Probate Code 
section 11604.117 This provision empowers a probate court to review heir 
hunting contracts sua sponte or if the administrator or any heir so requests.118 
In addition, section 11604 permits judges to rewrite or strike down 
assignments if “[t]he fees, charges, or consideration paid or agreed to be paid 
by a beneficiary are grossly unreasonable.”119 Likewise, section 13.2-3 of the 
 
113 See In re Butler’s Est., 177 P.2d at 18 ( “‘[C]ommercial exploitation’ of the legal profession . . . 
is contrary to public policy.”). 
114 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 423-24 (1963) (describing state regulation of 
“running” and “capping”); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6152(a)(1) (West 2020) (“It is unlawful 
for . . . [a]ny person . . . to act as a runner or capper for any attorneys or to solicit any business for 
any attorneys . . . .”). 
115 Merrick v. Larson (In re Larson’s Est.), 206 P.2d 852, 856 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Seidel v. United Cal. Bank (In re Estate of Collins), 73 
Cal. Rptr. 599, 602 (Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (“[W]hen a nonlawyer acts for prospective beneficiaries 
under arrangements providing for his payment of litigation expenses and the nonlawyer controls the 
litigation instituted on behalf of the beneficiaries, such procedure amounts to commercial 
exploitation of the legal profession.”). But see Foreman v. Gwirtz (In re Cohen’s Est.), 152 P.2d 485, 
488 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944) (holding that heir hunter did not violate ethical norms where he 
informed the heir “that he could not select a lawyer for her” and she “was represented . . . by 
attorneys of her own selection”). 
116 Handy v. Freeman (In re Est. of Freeman), 48 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3-4 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965). 
117 Legislators passed Probate Code sections 530 and 530.1 in 1939, and then consolidated them 
into Probate Code section 1020.1 in 1941. See Lund v. Hanlon (In re Lund’s Est.), 150 P.2d 211, 212 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944) (discussing this legislative history). In 1988, lawmakers “restated” section 
1020.1 in section 11604. Annual Report, 19 CAL. L. REVISION COMM’N 1151, 1224 (1988). 
118 CAL. PROB. CODE § 11604(b) (West 2020). Before lawmakers intervened, probate courts in 
California were hamstrung by archaic rules that forbade them from adjudicating “the validity of an 
assignment made by an heir, legatee or devisee of an interest in an estate.” Gordon v. Nichols, 195 
P.2d 444, 447 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948). This jurisdictional problem may still exist in other states 
that have yet to pass heir hunting statutes. See, e.g., Crosby v. Ide, 110 N.E.2d 314, 316 (Mass. 1953) 
(“A Probate Court . . . cannot take cognizance of assignments of their interests made by heirs, 
legatees, or distributees.”); Downs v. Myers (In re King’s Est.), 272 N.W. 205, 206 (Neb. 1937) 
(explaining that probate courts cannot hear an “extraneous controversy”); Friedman, supra note 51, at 
87 (“Connecticut’s probate courts are unable to oversee the activities of [heir hunters] because [they] 
currently have no jurisdiction over agreements between heir-hunters and beneficiaries of estates.”) 
119 CAL. PROB. CODE § 11604(c)(1). Heir hunters “bear[] the burden of establishing the 
adequacy of consideration for the assignment.” Gunning v. Caudill (Est. of Wright), 108 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 572, 580 (Ct. App. 2001). In addition, the probate court can intervene if “[t]he transfer, 
agreement, request, or instructions were obtained by duress, fraud, or undue influence.” CAL. PROB. 
CODE § 11604(c)(2). 
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New York Estates, Powers and Trust Law allows probate courts to decide 
whether heir hunters’ compensation is “reasonable.”120 
In sum, for more than a century, jurisdictions either prohibited or heavily 
regulated heir hunting. Yet, as we discuss next, that soon would change. 
B. Modern Confusion 
As the decades passed, the legal landscape surrounding heir hunters 
shifted. In addition, companies adjusted some of their practices to try to 
evade regulation. This section explains how these developments made the 
legal status of heir hunting unclear. 
1. Champerty’s Twilight 
In the second half of the twentieth century, champerty became embattled. 
A few states abolished the doctrine, calling it “anachronistic”121 and 
unnecessary in light of other rules that deter “frivolous lawsuits[] or financial 
overreaching by a party of superior bargaining position.”122 To be sure, a 
handful of courts reaffirmed their allegiance to the rule, opining that allowing 
plaintiffs to sell claims would spur litigation and “pervert[] the remedial 
process of the law into an engine of oppression.”123 Nevertheless, as the Ninth 
Circuit observed in 2011, “[t]he consistent trend across the country is toward 
limiting, not expanding, champerty’s reach.”124 
 
120 N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 13-2.3(a), (b)(3) (McKinney 2020). 
121 TMJ Haw., Inc. v. Nippon Trust Bank, 153 P.3d 444, 449 (Haw. 2007). 
122 Saladini v. Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (Mass. 1997); see also Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana 
Ltd. P’ship, 532 S.E.2d 269, 277 (S.C. 2000) (“[O]ther well-developed principles of law can more 
effectively accomplish the goals of preventing speculation in groundless lawsuits and the filing of 
frivolous suits . . . .”); Eagle Mountain City v. Parsons Kinghorn & Harris, P.C., 408 P.3d 322, 329 
(Utah 2017) (“‘[P]romot[ing] champerty’ is no longer the pressing concern to courts that it once 
was.” (quoting Goodley v. Wank & Wank, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 83, 87 (Ct. App. 1976))); cf. Kraft v. 
Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (opining that champerty is a historical relic). 
The anti-champerty movement has been simmering for a long time. See Note, Modern Views of 
Champerty and Maintenance, 18 HARV. L. REV. 222, 222-23 (1905) (observing that champerty’s “object 
was to prevent intimidation of the courts by the great lords” and that “under modern conditions this 
danger . . . has passed away”). 
123 Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ohio 2003) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); Lingel v. Olbin, 8 P.3d 1163, 1167 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (explaining that 
champerty prevents “multitudinous and useless litigation”); Johnson v. Wright, 682 N.W.2d 671, 679-
80 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (declining “to completely abandon the doctrine”); Fleetwood Area Sch. 
Dist. v. Berks Cnty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 821 A.2d 1268, 1273 (Pa. Commmw. Ct. 2003) 
(“[C]hamperty has long been considered repugnant to public policy against profiteering and 
speculating in litigation . . . .” (quoting Clark v. Cambria Cnty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 747 A.2d 
1242, 1245 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000))). 
124 Del Webb Cmtys., Inc. v. Partington, 652 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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Champerty’s decline has shifted heir hunting into a legal gray area. For 
example, in Finders Diversified, Inc. v. Baugh, which was decided in 1984, it 
was unclear whether an heir hunting contract was governed by Florida, 
Missouri, or Ohio law.125 However, an Ohio appellate court held that this 
detail made no difference, because all three states held that heir hunting 
caused “vexatious and speculative litigation” and therefore was 
champertous.126 Conversely, six years later, in Estate of Katze-Miller, the 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals disavowed the litigiousness theory of 
champerty.127 Embracing an argument that heir hunters had been making for 
decades,128 the court reasoned that because probate administration is non-
adversarial, heir hunters are engaged in “a fact-finding expedition rather than 
a litigious exercise.”129 
This haze still hangs over the field. In 2017, a Pennsylvania trial court 
invalidated an heir hunting contract for champerty despite noting that the 
rule “has not been the subject of an appellate court case [in the state] for over 
forty years.”130 The judge reasoned that the arrangement met all the elements 
of the doctrine: a third party who (1) has “no legitimate interest in the suit,” 
(2) “expend[s] his own money in prosecuting the suit,” and (3) is “entitled by 
the bargain to share in the proceeds of the suit.”131 But in 2019, a federal 
district court in Minnesota went the other way.132 The plaintiffs had assigned 
a quarter of their inheritances to Kemp & Associates.133 When Kemp’s fee 
ended up being more than $62,000, the plaintiffs accused the company of 
violating a consumer protection statute by soliciting their business even 
though it “knew that champerty and maintenance were prohibited in 
Minnesota.”134 The judge rejected this claim, noting that it could find no 
authority “that Minnesota’s laws against champerty and maintenance apply 
to Kemp’s business model.”135 
 
125 No. L-83-424, 1984 WL 7841, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 20, 1984) (per curiam). The opinion 
does not specify whether the assignment had a choice of law clause or the conflict of law question 
arose from the case’s factual background. See id. 
126 Id. at *2-3. 
127 Gertsch v. Int’l Equity Rsch. (In re Est. of Katze-Miller), 463 N.W.2d 853, 860 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). 
128 See supra text accompanying notes 85–86. 
129 In re Est. of Katze-Miller, 463 N.W.2d at 859. 
130 Opinion, In re Est. of Mikeska at 5, No. 02-15-1826 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Orphans’ Ct. Div. 
Oct. 31, 2017), aff ’d 217 A.3d 329 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2019). 
131 Id. 
132 Pickford v. Kemp & Assocs., Inc., No. 19-CV-997 (NEB/ECW), 2019 WL 3537219, at *3 
(D. Minn. Aug. 2, 2019). 
133 Id. at *1. 
134 Id. at *1-2. 
135 Id. at *3. A 2018 complaint accusing Kemp of champerty was recently settled. See Notice of 
Removal by Defendant Kemp & Associates at 1, Klink v. Kemp & Assocs., No. 1:18-cv-00368-HSO-
JCG (S.D. Miss. Nov. 19, 2018); Stipulation of Dismissal Under F.R.C.P. 41(a)(1), No. 1:18-cv-
00368-HSO-JCG (S.D. Miss. Aug. 13, 2019). 
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2. Legal Ethics 
Heir hunters also changed the way they obtained control over heirs’ 
claims. Recall that courts objected to contracts that expressly gave heir 
hunters the power to hire counsel for the heirs.136 Heir hunters tried to 
overcome this obstacle by giving their customers the “choice” to use the heir 
hunter’s counsel for free.137 Unfortunately, it is unclear whether this 
arrangement is permissible. 
In Estate of Lynch, which was decided in 1978, a California appellate court 
held that merely encouraging heirs to hire a lawyer did not constitute the 
unauthorized practice of law.138 In that case, the firm W.C. Cox procured 
assignments from fourteen heirs.139 The contract did not include a power of 
attorney; rather, Cox simply gave its clients the option to use the company’s 
lawyer “to protect [their] interest in the estate” at “no charge.”140 Not 
surprisingly, all of the heirs accepted Cox’s offer.141 The majority held that 
Cox had not violated ethical rules, reasoning that “[t]he heirs were not 
required to use Cox’s attorney.”142 
However, not every judge agrees that dual representation—where the 
same lawyer works for both the company and the heir—is benign. For 
instance, in a blistering dissent in Lynch, Justice Kaus explained why Cox’s 
technique of nudging heirs toward its lawyer was profoundly misleading: 
[I]t implies a mutuality of interest between assignee and heir which 
does not, in fact, exist. First I very much doubt whether the attorney 
picked by the assignee considered it part of his duty to the heir to 
explain that he could attack the assignment [as unreasonable]. Second, 
even if the assignor’s and the assignee’s interests coincide as to the 
total amount which the heir is to receive from the estate, the heir may 
have problems of timing, taxes, nature of interest and so forth about 
which the assignee could not care less and which, to avoid delay, he 
does not want raised.143 
 
136 See supra text accompanying notes 113–15. 
137 See Ingraham, supra note 51, at 107 (“[H]eir-hunters have learned to . . . omit[] in the formal 
written contract any reference to their control of the heir’s claim.”). 
138 Altman v. Cox (In re Est. of Lynch), 147 Cal. Rptr. 861, 867 (Ct. App. 1978). 
139 Id. at 863. 
140 Id. 
141 See id. (stating that all fourteen heirs “signed retainer agreements” with the heir-hunter’s attorney). 
142 Id. (emphasis added). But see Florida State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Pro. Ethics, Op. 77-8 (1977) 
(“It is improper for an attorney to allow an heir-hunting service to advise potential heirs of his services.”). 
143 In re Est. of Lynch, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 868 (Kaus, J., dissenting). In 2012, a complaint accused Jeff 
Piccola, a longtime Pennsylvania state senator, of violating ethical rules by serving as an attorney for both 
heirs and an heir hunter in the same probate matter. See Mark Scolforo, Pa. Senator in Legal Jeopardy over 
Heir Hunting, WASH. EXAM’R (Aug. 2, 2012, 1:09 PM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/pa-
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Likewise, the D.C. Circuit and Pennsylvania Superior Court have both 
opined that dual representation “creates not a potential but an actual and 
present conflict of interest.”144 
In Estate of Wright, which was decided in 2001, another California appellate 
panel analyzed the heir hunting contract with more nuance than in Lynch.145 
Joseph Caudill, a private investigator working for an heir hunter, located 
Dorothy Gunning, the decedent’s missing sister.146 Gunning agreed to assign 
thirty-five percent of her inheritance to the heir hunter.147 Gunning also 
executed two documents: a limited power of attorney that authorized Caudill 
“to order and receive any and all documentation relating to [her] identity or 
the identity of [her] parents”148 and a general power of attorney that allowed 
John Boessenecker, a San Francisco lawyer, “to exercise or perform any act, 
power, duty, right or obligation whatsoever.”149 Eventually, Gunning revoked 
the general power of attorney and hired a Reno law firm to represent her in 
the case.150 
The court classified the two powers of attorney differently. First, it upheld 
the instrument that entitled Caudill to collect evidence about Gunning’s 
lineage.151 As the court remarked, this arrangement “did not empower Caudill 
to represent Gunning or to control the probate litigation.”152 Second, the 
court invalidated the power of attorney in favor of Boessenecker.153 The court 
 
senator-in-legal-jeopardy-over-heir-hunting [https://perma.cc/LP6H-YA5D] (“The charges relate to his 
dealings as local lawyer for Salt Lake City-based Kemp and Associates, an heir-hunting firm, as they 
contacted and came to work on behalf of heirs to three people who died in south-central Pennsylvania in 
2003 and 2006.”). Piccola ultimately agreed to accept a “public rebuke” from the Disciplinary Board 
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Matt Miller, Senator Jeffrey Piccola Receives Public Reprimand from 
State Disciplinary Board, PENN LIVE PATRIOT-NEWS (Jan. 5, 2019), https://www.pennlive.com/
midstate/2012/11/senator_jeffrey_piccola_receiv.html [https://perma.cc/B5PT-7XUR]. 
144 Sullivan v. Comm. on Admissions & Grievances of the U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 395 F.2d 
954, 956-57 (D.C. Cir. 1967); see also In re Atkinson’s Est., 20 Pa. D. & C.3d 700, 721 (C.P. Phila. 
Cnty., Orphans’ Ct. Div. 1981), aff ’d sub nom. Est. of Atkinson, 468 A.2d 841 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) 
(echoing this reasoning). Similar conflicts of interest can arise in the insurance defense context. If 
a plaintiff sues an insured and it is not clear that all of the claims are covered by the policy, “the 
standard practice of an insurer is to defend under a reservation of rights where the insurer promises 
to defend but states it may not indemnify the insured if liability is found.” San Diego Navy Fed. 
Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc’y, Inc., 208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 498 (Ct. App. 1984). In turn, this means 
that the defense lawyer’s duties to the company may clash with her obligations to the insured. To 
resolve this dilemma, some states require insurers to pay for independent counsel to represent the 
insured. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860 (West 2020). 
145 Gunning v. Caudill (Est. of Wright), 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 572 (Ct. App. 2001). 
146 See id. at 574-75. 
147 See id. at 575. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 See id. at 576. 
151 See id. at 577. 
152 Id. 
153 See id. at 577-78. 
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reasoned that by obtaining this document, Caudill had impermissibly 
engaged in running and capping by “solicit[ing] business for an attorney.”154 
Nevertheless, the court held that the defective power of attorney did not 
doom the underlying assignment of thirty-five percent of Gunning’s 
inheritance.155 In the court’s eyes, the critical fact was that Gunning had cut 
her ties to Boessenecker: 
The result here may have been different had the heir hunter succeeded 
in inducing Gunning to employ Boessenecker as her attorney. In such 
event, all the documents may have been so inextricably tied to one 
other that the taint of Boessencker’s power of attorney may have 
rendered them all void for reasons of public policy. But Gunning 
revoked the power of attorney and employed independent counsel.156 
Thus, the court implied—but did not hold—that heir hunting 
assignments can be invalid if the company persuades the heir to hire the 
company’s counsel.157 
3. Unclaimed Property Statutes 
As these changes were brewing, the widespread adoption of unclaimed 
property statutes transformed how some courts viewed heir hunters’ fees. 
Within the last half-century, almost every state has enacted a comprehensive 
scheme to address the escheat of abandoned intangible property, such as 
money held in accounts with no ascertainable accountholder.158 These laws 
deem an asset to be “abandoned”—and hence eligible for escheat—if nobody 
 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 578. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. For a similar sentiment, see In re Est. of Campbell, 742 A.2d 639, 642 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Ch. Div. 1999). The administrator challenged the heir hunter’s fees as excessive. Id. at 640. The 
court held that the administrator lacked standing to raise the issue because she “is not a party to 
those agreements” and that any such complaint “should arise in an action between the heirs and the 
genealogical firm.” Id. at 641. Yet in a footnote, the court flagged the dual representation problem: 
The court is concerned, however, with defense counsel’s apparent dual role in this 
matter. While describing itself as counsel “for the heirs” it seems that defense counsel 
is also representing the interests of the genealogical firm in connection with the 
dispute raised by the administratrix herein. The interests of the genealogical firm and 
the heirs, however, are not aligned on the issue raised. 
Id. at 642 n.5. The court therefore ordered the lawyers to send a copy of its opinion to the heirs. See id. 
158 See Haven Sav. Bank v. Zanolini, 3 A.3d 608, 616 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) 
(surveying the different kinds of unclaimed property statutes). 
2021] Heir Hunting 405 
claims it for a specified time period.159 The government then seizes the 
derelict property and holds it while trying to find the rightful owners.160 
Two aspects of these laws govern heir hunters. First, about thirty 
jurisdictions’ unclaimed property statutes invalidate heir hunting contracts 
that pertain to assets that have been in state custody for two years or less.161 
The purpose of this post-escheat “no-fly zone” is to increase the odds that 
rightful owners will track down government-held property themselves.162 
Second, once the two year ban has expired, states cap the amount that heir 
hunters can charge. Most set the ceiling at 10% of the value of the property, 
although others are as low as 5% or as high as 35%.163 
 
159 See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT § 201 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2016) 
(providing time periods that vary by the type of property). 
160 See id. § 603(a) (requiring that all property reported as abandoned be delivered to the administrator). 
161 Id. § 1302(a) (“[A]n agreement . . . is void if it is entered into during the period beginning 
on the date the property was paid or delivered by a holder to the administrator and ending 24 months 
after the payment or delivery.”). These states’ statutes are codified at ALA. CODE § 35-12-93(a) 
(2019); ALASKA STAT. § 34.45.700(a)(2) (2020); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-327(A)(1) (2019); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-28-225(a) (West 2020); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-13-128(1) (West 2019); 
GA. CODE ANN. § 44-12-224(a) (West 2019); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 523A-25(a) (LexisNexis 
2020); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 14-536 (West 2019); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1026/15-1302(a) 
(West 2019); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-34-1-46(a)(2) (West 2019); IOWA CODE ANN. § 556.11(10) 
(West 2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3968(a) (West 2019); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:177(A) (2020); ME. 
REV. STAT. tit. 33, § 2201(1) (West 2019); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 17-325 (West 2019); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 567.256 (West 2020); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 345.515 (West 2019); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-9-825 (2019); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120A.740(1) (West 2019); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 471-C:39(1) (West 2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 116B-78(a)(2) (West 2019); 
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 47-30.1-35(1) (West 2019); 33 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-21.1-35 (West 
2019); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-18-360 (West 2019); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-41B-36 (2004); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 66-29-176(c) (West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-4a-1302(1) (West 2013); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 27, § 1265(b) (West 2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-24-136(a) (West 2019); cf. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 55.1-2542(A) (West 2020) (expanding the cooling-off period to three years after the property 
escheats); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 177.35(2)(a) (West 2018) (limiting the period to one year); D.C. CODE 
ANN. § 41-137(a) (West 2019) (limiting the period to seven months). 
162 REVISED UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT § 1302 cmt. (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2016) . 
163 See ALA. CODE § 35-12-93(d) (ten percent); ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-28-225(b) (same); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 44-12-224(b) (same); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1026/15-1302(c) (same); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 32-34-1-46(b)(1) (“[T]en percent . . . unless the amount collected is fifty dollars ($50) 
or less.”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:177(d) (ten percent); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 345.515 (same); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 120A.740(4) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 1265(e) (same); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 55.1-2542(b) (same); cf. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 34.45.700(B) (“20 percent of the value of the 
property if the value of the property is less than $500; and 10 percent of the value of the property if 
the value of the property is $500 or more.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-327(C) (thirty percent); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 674.1(A)(2) (West 2020) (twenty-five percent); HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 523A-25(d) (same); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 177.35 (twenty percent); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 556.11(10) (fifteen percent); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3968(b) (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-18-360 
(same); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 33, § 2201(6) (fifteen percent if it is between twenty-four and thirty-
six months after property is delivered to administrator); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 63.29.350 
(West 2020) (five percent). 
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Bizarrely, although these fee limitations expressly apply only to abandoned 
property, some courts have also applied them to recently-filed probate 
matters.164 For example, in Landi v. Arkules, a company obtained a 40% 
assignment from an heir.165 Although the estate was not in government 
custody, an Arizona appellate court held that the contract violated the state 
unclaimed property law’s 30% maximum.166 The court admitted that the 
statute did not “literally appl[y],” but nevertheless concluded that the deal 
violated the spirit of the law.167 
Conversely, the unclaimed property statute helped heir hunting gain 
legitimacy in New Jersey. Courts in the Garden State once dismissed the 
practice as a “racket.”168 But more recently, judges have cited the unclaimed 
property law as proof that the legislature intends “to regulate, not prohibit, 
the business.”169 For example, in Estate of Campbell, the administrator argued 
that an heir hunter’s 35% fee was unconscionable and violated public policy.170 
The court noted that the estate had not been abandoned and therefore did 
not fall under the unclaimed property law.171 Nevertheless, the court cited the 
legislation as proof that the legislature harbors “no particular hostility” 
toward heir hunters and opined that it would be difficult to find that the 
assignments were invalid “when the compensation agreed to by the 
genealogical firm and the heirs falls within the [statutory] ceiling . . . .”172 
 
164 To be clear, the UUPA applies to any agreement to recover property for a third party, not 
just heir hunting. See, e.g., Haven Sav. Bank v. Zanolini, 3 A.3d 608, 610 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2010) (analyzing a contract to locate unpaid proceeds from foreclosure sales); In re Taylor, 216 B.R. 
515, 517 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (considering an agreement to find unclaimed bankruptcy funds). 
165 835 P.2d 458, 460-61 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). 
166 Id. at 465. 
167 Id. But see Nelson v. McGoldrick, 896 P.2d 1258, 1266 (Wash. 1995) (“We are unable to 
discern legislative intent that this policy should extend beyond the statute’s terms.”). 
168 Carey v. Thieme, 64 A.2d 394, 398 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1949). 
169 Twiss v. State, Dep’t of Treasury, Off. of Fin. Mgmt., 591 A.2d 913, 920 (N.J. 1991) (Stein, 
J., dissenting). 
170 742 A.2d 639, 640 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1999). 
171 See id. at 640-41. 
172 Id. at 641. The court ultimately held that the issue was moot because the administrator 
lacked standing to complain about the fees. See id. In addition, the rise of law and economics affected 
the way some courts viewed the propriety of heir hunters’ fees. To slightly oversimplify, “Chicago 
school” academics began to argue that the legal system should generally enforce private transactions, 
no matter how “harsh” they seem. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive 
Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1055 (1977) (“[P]overty, market unresponsiveness, and 
incompetence are improper reasons to invalidate a contract.”); George L. Priest, A Theory of the 
Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297, 1348 (1981) (arguing that if sellers are prevented from 
using contract terms to segregate consumers according to risk, “both manufacturers and consumers 
are worse off ”). This laissez-faire ideology began to surface in legal opinions. For example, in In re 
Estate of Croake, 578 N.E.2d 567, 569 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), an Illinois appellate court rejected an heir’s 
argument that an assignment of 33% of his inheritance was unconscionable. The judges refused to 
“set aside a contract merely because [it] is not a wise one from the standpoint of the party seeking 
rescission” or “merely because it is unfair.” Id. Likewise, other courts upheld heir hunting assignment 
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4. Litigation Funding 
Finally, champerty’s retreat fueled a controversial new industry that 
borrows from the heir hunting playbook. In the 1990s, third party litigation 
funders began advancing money to plaintiffs in return for a partial assignment 
of any damage award or settlement.173 Like heir hunters, these companies 
acquire an interest in a pending case and are paid only if their clients 
recover.174 Eventually, litigation financing became a popular investment for 
banks, hedge funds, and private equity firms,175 blossoming into a billion-
dollar business176 that has provoked fierce debate.177 
Third party litigation funding raises many of the same concerns as heir 
hunting. First, echoing the litigiousness theory of champerty,178 critics argue 
that allowing outsiders to buy a share of a lawsuit increases the likelihood of 
“abusive litigation.”179 In fact, the Sixth Circuit and the Ohio Supreme Court 
have cited precedent involving heir hunters to strike down litigation funding 
 
while declaring that “[p]ublic policy commands that [we] enforce contracts voluntarily entered 
between competent adult parties.” Gertsch v. Int’l Equity Rsch. (In re Estate of Katze-Miller), 463 
N.W.2d 853, 859 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). 
173 For descriptions of the rise of litigation finance, see Leslie Spencer, Some Call It Champerty, 
FORBES, Apr. 30, 1990, at 72; Ari Dobner, Comment, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 
1529-30 (1996); Steinitz, Whose Claim?, supra note 44, at 1276-77. The phrase “third party” refers to 
the fact that an outsider “finance[s] the legal representation of a party in a case as an alternative to 
the party self-funding the legal representation or receiving attorney financing through a contingent 
or conditional fee agreement.” Victoria A. Shannon, Harmonizing Third-Party Litigation Funding 
Regulation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 861, 863 (2015). 
174 See AM. BAR. ASS’N COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, INFORMATIONAL REPORT TO THE 
HOUSE OF DELEGATES 6 (2012) (“The business model requires that the [funder] assume the 
risk . . . if the claim is unsuccessful . . . .”). 
175 See Joanna M. Shepherd & Judd E. Stone II, Economic Conundrums in Search of A Solution: 
The Functions of Third-Party Litigation Finance, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 919, 920 (2015) (describing the rapid 
growth of litigation financing both domestically and internationally). 
176 See, e.g., Jeffrey Schacknow, Comment, Applying the Common Interest Doctrine to Third-Party 
Litigation Funding, 66 EMORY L.J. 1461, 1464 (2017) (observing that American investors have 
contributed “upwards of $1 billion directly to plaintiffs’ firms”). 
177 See Courtney R. Barksdale, Note, All That Glitters Isn’t Gold: Analyzing the Costs and Benefits 
of Litigation Finance, 26 REV. LITIG. 707, 735 (2007) (proposing that policymakers increase the 
information available about funders and regulate the amount of fees they charge); Paul Bond, 
Comment, Making Champerty Work: An Invitation to State Action, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1297, 1317 (2002) 
(urging state legislatures to revamp the champerty doctrine); Jason Lyon, Comment, Revolution in 
Progress: Third-Party Funding of American Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 571, 571 (2010) (contending 
that funding “should be permitted but regulated to guard against its fairly limited dangers”); Martin, 
Wild West, supra note 44, at 68 (“It would be bad policy and unfair to poor plaintiffs with good cases 
to regulate litigation financing firms out of business.”); Steinitz, Whose Claim?, supra note 44, at 1326 
(arguing that the costs of litigation funding are dwarfed by its ability to facilitate access to justice). 
178 See supra text accompanying note 105. 
179 SELLING LAWSUITS, supra note 44, at 5-7; see also Joshua G. Richey, Comment, Tilted Scales 
of Justice? The Consequences of Third-Party Financing of American Litigation, 63 EMORY L.J. 489, 500 
(2013) (“[T]hird-party litigation financing . . . encourages parties to file frivolous claims.”). 
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contracts as champertous.180 Second, litigation funding can create ethical 
complications. Funders often try to maximize their returns by insisting that 
the plaintiff give them authority to select a lawyer or make strategic 
decisions.181 This means that attorneys must balance the duties owed to their 
client with the funder’s contractual right to direct the litigation.182 Finally, 
litigation funding fees can seem inflated.183 For instance, there are anecdotal 
accounts of companies charging interest rates of 15% per month184 and 280% 
per year.185 In these ways, policy concerns about heir hunting and litigation 
funding overlap. 
Nevertheless, there are also important differences between the two 
businesses. For one, because litigation funders advance money to litigants in 
return for the (potential) repayment of a larger sum in the future, they may 
be subject to state usury laws, which limit annual interest rates on loans at 
 
180 Boling v. Prospect Funding Holdings, LLC, 771 F. App’x 562, 578-79 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing 
Skinner v. Morrow, 318 S.W.2d 419 (Ky. 1958)); Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 
N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ohio 2003) (citing Finders Diversified, Inc. v. Baugh, No. L-83-424, 1984 WL 7841 
(Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 20, 1984)). Other courts have reached the same conclusion but not relied on 
authority involving heir hunters. See, e.g., Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 726 
(N.D. Ill. 2014); Maslowski v. Prospect Funding Partners LLC, 890 N.W.2d 756, 763 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2017). But see Odell v. Legal Bucks, LLC, 665 S.E.2d 767, 775 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008) (rejecting 
champerty challenge to litigation funding contract). In 2013, David Abrams and Daniel Chen 
published a study of data harvested from Australia’s largest funder, IMF. Abrams & Chen, supra 
note 44, at 1081. They determined that courts in Australian territories where IMF was the most 
active took longer and spent more to resolve disputes. See id. at 1102-03. Yet on the other hand, they 
did not find a statistically meaningful link between IMF’s presence in a region and the volume of 
complaints filed. See id. 
181 See Steinitz, Incorporating Claims, supra note 44, at 1165-66 (“[C]ommercial funders are 
emboldened to seek overt control and not mere influence over the litigations they invest in.”). 
182 See Douglas R. Richmond, Other People’s Money: The Ethics of Litigation Funding, 56 
MERCER L. REV. 649, 669-74 (2005) (describing this tension as “[a] primary concern with litigation 
funding”). In addition, funders sometimes insist that plaintiff ’s counsel divulges information that is 
protected by the work-product or attorney-client privileges. See James M. Fischer, Litigation 
Financing: A Real or Phantom Menace to Lawyer Professional Responsibility?, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
191, 200 (2014). 
183 See Paige Marta Skiba & Jean Xiao, Consumer Litigation Funding: Just Another Form of Payday 
Lending?, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117, 122 (2017) (comparing interest rates in litigation 
funding to those in payday lending). 
184 Barksdale, supra note 177, at 708. 
185 Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., No. 20523, 2001 WL 1339487, at *2 (Ohio 
Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2001). But see Avraham & Sebok, supra note 44, at 1150-51 (analyzing data from a 
major litigation funder and discovering that although the median contractually-mandated annual 
interest rate was 115%, the company only recovered a median of 45% in annual interest “because 
some clients did not pay anything back, and many of them received a haircut on their balances”). 
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about 10%.186 Heir hunters, by contrast, do not pay cash up front, and thus 
are exempt from these laws.187 
In addition, during the past few years, policymakers have aggressively 
regulated litigation funders. For example, in 2017, the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB) filed an enforcement action against RD Legal 
Funding for allegedly luring “consumers into . . . cash advance agreements” 
that were “void under state law.”188 Likewise, lawmakers in about ten states 
have passed statutes either capping litigation funders’ interest rates189 or 
requiring them to make disclosures to potential clients.190 Conversely, no 
legislature has addressed probate-based heir hunting since California and 
New York passed their statutes more than eighty years ago.191 
*** 
 
186 Whether funders must satisfy usury statutes is unclear. Traditionally, usury laws only 
govern “loans,” which is defined as an advance of money that is “absolutely repayable.” Ghirardo v. 
Antonioli, 883 P.2d 960, 965 (Cal. 1994). Thus, because funders’ payments are non-recourse—if the 
plaintiff recovers nothing, the funder also recovers nothing—several courts have held that they are 
not “loans” and are therefore exempt from usury regulation. See, e.g., MoneyForLawsuits V LP v. 
Rowe, No. 10–CV–11537, 2012 WL 1068760, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 29, 2012) (“Michigan 
law . . . requires an absolute obligation-to-repay to trigger application of [the] usury statute.”); 
Anglo-Dutch Petrol. Int’l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 98 (Tex. App. 2006) (holding that a 
funder’s payment did not trigger the usury statute when its duty to repay “depended upon a 
contingency beyond [its] control”). But see Echeverria v. Est. of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 
WL 1083704, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005), judgment entered sub nom. Echeverria v. Lindner, 801 
N.Y.S.2d 233 (Table), at *9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (holding that funder’s payment in strict liability 
action was a “loan” because “the plaintiff is almost guaranteed to recover”). 
187 See supra text accompanying notes 78–83. 
188 Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, 332 F. Supp. 3d 729, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018). To be clear, the case did not involve funding of a pending complaint; rather, the alleged victims 
had assigned their right to future payments stemming from settlements relating to the September 
11 attacks and concussions sustained while playing professional football. Id. at 746-49. The court 
ultimately held that the CFPB lacked the power to bring the claim because it was unconstitutionally 
structured. See id. at 785. 
189 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-16-110(a) (West 2020) (“All consumers entering into litigation 
financing transactions shall pay the litigation financier an annual fee of not more than ten percent 
(10%) of the original amount of money provided to the consumer for the litigation financing 
transaction.”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604C.310(1) (West 2020) (setting a maximum annual 
interest rate of 40%). 
190 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A §§ 12-104(1), (2) (2019); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-
3303(1) (West 2020); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604C.360; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55(B) 
(LexisNexis 2020); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A § 3-807 (West 2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-16-
106(b); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 2253(a)-(c) (West 2020). 
191 See supra text accompanying notes 116–22. As noted above, state legislatures have recently 
regulated the discrete issue of heir hunting related to abandoned property. See supra text 
accompanying notes 161–63. 
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In sum, there is vast confusion about the legal status of heir hunting. In 
the next Part, we describe how we designed a study of more than a thousand 
recently-filed probate cases to try to answer these questions. 
II. EMPIRICALLY ASSESSING HEIR HUNTING 
This Part reports the Article’s empirical findings about heir hunting. It 
begins by explaining our research techniques, and then discusses some 
overarching results. 
A. Data Description 
Although California Probate Code section 11604 does not expressly 
require heir hunters to divulge their contracts, it achieves that result through 
the back door.192 As we mentioned, the statute allows judges to evaluate the 
fairness of these transactions.193 Counter-intuitively, heir hunters have strong 
incentives to submit their agreements to court to facilitate this review. For 
one, when an heir hunter files an assignment and no one objects, then the 
order on final distribution conclusively establishes its validity.194 Also, by 
obtaining the court’s approval, heir hunters can request that the administrator 
pay them directly during the final distribution.195 Collection from the estate 
is cheaper, faster, and more reliable than trying to recapture funds that were 
initially disbursed to the heirs. For these reasons, section 11604 in effect 
functions as a disclosure mandate. 
To capitalize on this window into heir hunting, we analyzed probate files 
from San Francisco County, California. Using the Superior Court’s online 
“search by date” tab, research assistants collected every matter that appeared 
 
192 By way of comparison, a different statutory provision that governs probate lenders requires 
the “written agreement [to be] filed with the court not later than 30 days following the date of its 
execution.” CAL. PROB. CODE § 11604.5(d)(1) (West 2020). 
193 The statute provides in relevant part: 
The court may refuse to order distribution, or may order distribution on any terms 
that the court deems just and equitable, if the court finds either of the following: (1) 
The fees, charges, or consideration paid or agreed to be paid by a beneficiary are 
grossly unreasonable. (2) The transfer, agreement, request, or instructions were 
obtained by duress, fraud, or undue influence. 
PROB. § 11604(c). 
194 See Burchell v. Strube, 279 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1955) (holding that a probate court’s determination 
of the reasonableness of an heir hunter’s fees under the predecessor to section 11604 triggers the 
doctrine of res judicata). 
195 See, e.g., Ord. Approving First & Final Rep. & Acct. of Pers. Representative & Petition for 
Its Settlement, for Allowance of Comm’n to Pers. Representative, Fees to the Att’y, for Payment to 
Cal. Victim[’s] Comp. & Claims Board in Sum of $1,971.25 from Robert S. Peet’s Share, & for Final 
Distrib. at 3, Est. of Pait, No. PES-14-297612 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 2015) (disbursing money 
directly to ARB). 
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on the docket between January 1, 2014 and December 31, 2016.196 We then 
created two datasets. One consisted of about thirty variables from all 1,349 
cases, including demographic information about the decedent,197 whether she 
died intestate or made a will,198 the value of her property,199 whether litigation 
occurred,200 and the amount of personal representatives’ and attorneys’ 
fees.201 The other spreadsheet consisted of matters in which heir hunters 
appeared. We collected detailed information from these cases, including the 
timing of the contract, the relationship between the heir and the decedent, 
the fee collected by the heir hunter, and the identity of the heir’s lawyer. 
Focusing on San Francisco has both advantages and drawbacks. On the 
one hand, the county provides free access to all filings in every case. This 
liberal policy allowed us to review the thousands of documents that were 
necessary to collect our data. But on the other hand, San Francisco County is 
not nationally representative. Indeed, its residents have higher median 
incomes and home values than the rest of the country.202 Because heir hunters 
may be drawn to wealthy estates, they may not be as active in other regions. 
B. General Results 
Heir hunting contracts appear frequently in our data. Admittedly, only 
thirty-one of the 676 intestacies (4.6%) involved an heir hunter. But because 
heir hunters pursue matters with large classes of heirs, such as decedents 
survived by multiple cousins, these cases tended to generate a high volume of 
assignments. In fact, one estate featured thirty-three heirs, thirty-one of 
 
196 See Case Calendar, SUPER. CT. OF S.F., https://webapps.sftc.org/cc/
CaseCalendar.dll?=&SessionID=234265FB7A045EF3B4DD02F420AB8711094F2C46 
[https://perma.cc/TW8U-MYHE]. 
197 Of the 1,261 decedents whose gender appears in the record, 694 (55%) were men and 567 
(45%) were women. 
198 The numbers here split right down the middle: there are 676 intestate decedents (50%) and 
673 testate decedents (50%). 
199 The average estate value in the 1,175 administrations that included this information was 
$1,185,418. Intestate decedents (who owned a mean of $902,344.60) were less wealthy than their 
testate counterparts (who clocked in at $1,397,302) by a statistically significant margin (p < 0.01). 
200 We discuss litigation infra subsection III.A.1.a in connection with the litigiousness theory 
of champerty. 
201 See infra Section III.C (comparing the average amount of personal representative and 
attorneys’ fees to heir hunters’ fees). 
202 Compare QuickFacts: San Francisco County, California, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/sanfranciscocountycalifornia [https://perma.cc/JD8Q-G7KX] (listing 
San Francisco County’s median household income as $104,552 and median owner-occupied housing value 
as $1,009,500), with QuickFacts: United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/q
uickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045218 [https://perma.cc/HVQ6-QS4H] (stating that the United States has 
a median household income of $60,293 and a median owner-occupied housing value of $204,900). 
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whom had signed heir hunting contracts,203 and another boasted thirty heirs 
and twenty-seven agreements.204 Ultimately, we unearthed 219 assignments.  
 
Table 1: Heir Hunting Fees205 
 









$130 $216,239 152 
 
Seven different firms appear in our data. Figure 3 breaks them down by 
market share as measured by dollars earned: Brandenburger & Davis (34%), 
W.C. Cox (28%), American Research Bureau (17%), Trust and Estates Search 















203 See Ord. for Final Distrib.; Settling & Approving Second & Final Acct. and Rep. of Adm’r; 
Allowing Statutory Att’y’s & Adm’r’s Comp.; & Allowing Prob. Code § 7621(d) Bond Fee at 3-8, 
Est. of Vecsey, No. PES-14-297488 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 2019). 
204 See Ord. for Final Distrib.; Settling First & Final Acct. & Rep. of Adm’r; Allowing 
Statutory Comp. to Adm’r as His Att’ys and Reimbursement of Att’ys’ Costs; And Authorizing 
Rsrv. for Taxes and Closing Costs at 4-7, Est. of Sheldon, No. PES-16-300458 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed 
Nov. 14, 2019). 
205 These calculations exclude thirty-eight agreements in cases that are still pending, twenty-
eight contracts on which heir hunters collected nothing, and one assignment in which the heir was 
a child and the record did not reveal information about his inheritance. 
206 Some firms appear to be bitter rivals. As noted supra note 43, Kemp & Associates recently 
plead guilty to criminal antitrust allegations. In one case, for no apparent reason, W.C. Cox asked 
the court to take judicial notice of the fact that Kemp & Associates and its President are “convicted 
felons.” Supplemental Declaration of John E. Boessenecker in Support of Motion to Compel Enf ’t 
of Settlement Agreement at 2, In re Est. of Vargas, No. PES-14-298101 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Sept. 
26, 2019). 
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Heir hunting’s geographic sweep is impressive. Table 2 reveals that 
eighty-five (39%) heirs live outside of the U.S.207 In addition, as Figure 4 
demonstrates, firms located members of the decedent’s family in twenty-
seven American jurisdictions.  
 





El Salvador 2 
 
207 To facilitate heir hunting’s global reach, domestic heir hunters sometimes collaborate with 
their foreign counterparts. See, e.g., Declaration of Neil Fraser in Support of First & Final Acct. & 
Rep. of Adm’r & Petition for Its Settlement; Petition for Payment of Statutory Fees for Ordinary 
Servs. to Adm’r & to His Att’y; Petition to Retain Rsrv. for Taxes & Closing Costs; Petition to 
Reduce Bond; & Petition for Final Distrib. at 2, In re Est. of Johnsson, No. PES-15-298936 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. filed July 13, 2017) (explaining that the British heir hunting company Fraser & Fraser 
partnered with the American firm Brandenburger & Davis). 
208 Three heirs’ countries do not appear in the court files. 
Brandenburger & Davis W.C. Cox
American Research Bureau Trust and Estate Search
Estate Research Associates Family Tree
Kemp & Associates




























Our research also casts new light on how heir hunters operate. Their 
business model requires a basic understanding of the statute of descent and 




209 For the history of these statutes, see W.D. Rollison, Principles of the Law of Succession to 
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Figure 5’s table of consanguinity helps make this system concrete. Simple 
estates never progress further than the left-most column: courts divide an 
unmarried decedent’s property among her living children or the descendants 
of her dead children.211 However, if the decedent has no surviving 
descendants, the statute of descent and distribution moves up a generation—
advancing one column to the right along the table—and allocates property to 
the decedent’s parents if they are alive, or to the decedent’s surviving siblings, 
or to the children of deceased siblings (the decedent’s nieces and nephews).212 
If there are no living descendants of the decedent’s parents, the statute climbs 
another level on the family tree (one more step to the right in Figure 5) and 
looks for surviving descendants of the decedent’s grandparents.213 In most 
states, this cycle continues all the way to “laughing heirs”: people who are “so 
loosely linked to [an] ancestor as to suffer no sense of bereavement at h[er] loss.”214 
 
210 Table of Consanguinity: Showing Degrees of Relationship, WIKIMEDIA COMMONS (Mar. 22, 2012), 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Table_of_Consanguinity_showing_degrees_of_relationship.png 
[https://perma.cc/VDW3-YSL2]. 
211 See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-103(a)(1) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2013). 
212 Id. § 2-103(a)(2)-(a)(3). 
213 Id. § 2-103(a)(4). In California, the statute of descent and distribution also gives inheritance 
rights to the decedent’s step-relations. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6402(g) (West 2020). 
214 David F. Cavers, Change in the American Family and the “Laughing Heir”, 20 IOWA L. REV. 
203, 208 (1935); see also David V. DeRosa, Note, Intestate Succession and the Laughing Heir: Who Do 
We Want to Get the Last Laugh?, 12 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 153, 154 (1997) (“The traditional statute 
governing intestate succession provides an inheritance to the intestate decedent’s ‘next of kin,’ no 
matter how distantly removed.”). 
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To find potential clients who are entitled to inherit under the statute of 
decent and distribution, heir hunters gather information from two sources. 
The first is the petition for letters of administration. This filing—which is 
probate’s version of a complaint—must identify the decedent’s closest 
surviving relatives.215 Firms spend countless hours “review[ing] thousands” 
of these documents in search of petitions that list distant or unknown kin.216 
In fact, ARB claims that it “literally combs through every probate that is filed 
in San Francisco.”217 Second, heir hunters solicit tips from so-called 
“reporters.”218 Reporters, who possess inside knowledge about particular 
probate matters, flag promising estates in return for an initial “acceptance 
fee” and the possibility of a bonus at the end of the matter.219 
In our sample, once heir hunters have identified a promising case, they 
use their vast resources to find the decedent’s heirs. Most have accumulated 
troves of genetic information.220 For example, Brandenburger & Davis boasts 
that it “maintains its own 6,500 square foot research library containing over 
40,000 volumes of city directories, birth, death, and marriage indices, 
historical genealogies, filed obituaries and assessors’ records.”221 Likewise, 
W.C. Cox touts a “a research library that now numbers nearly sixty-thousand 
volumes, and contains many collectable rarities.”222 For particularly 
challenging matters, companies consult the Latter-Day Saints’ Family 
 
215 In California, this petition can be downloaded as a fill-in-the-blank form. DE-111, PETITION 
FOR PROBATE, https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/de111.pdf [https://perma.cc/4N7T-V6EB]. 
216 See, e.g., Declaration of Douglas B. Bohne in Response to Exam’r Notes for First & Final Rep. 
& Acct. of Pers. Representative & Petition for Its Settlement, for Allowance of Comm’n to Pers. 
Representative, Fees to the Att’y, for Payment to Cal. Victims[’] Comp. & Claims in Sum of $1,971.25 
from Robert S. Peet’s Share, & for Final Distrib. at 2, Est. of Pait, No. PES-14-297612 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
filed Aug. 31, 2015) [hereinafter Bohne Declaration] (describing the efforts of one firm to track down 
distant family); Declaration of Lee Cox in Support of Final Rep. of Adm’r on Waiver of Acct.; Petition 
for Approval of Rep.; for Award of Statutory Att’y[s’] Fees & Extraordinary Att’y[s’] Fees; & for Final 
Distrib. at 2, In re Est. of Palacpac, No. PES-14-297716 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 31, 2017) [hereinafter Cox 
Palacpac Declaration] (explaining that an heir hunter “spend[s] many hours . . . researching hundreds 
of probate petitions filed within the numerous county courts in California”). 
217 Declaration of J. Daniel Schwartz in Support of Validity of Assignments at 2, In re Est. of 
Imperial, No. PES-16-299740 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 26, 2018) [hereinafter Schwartz Declaration]. 
218 See, e.g., Declaration of Paul A. Hefti in Response to Prob. Exam’r Notes Regarding Petition 
to Determine Distrib. Rights at 2, Est. of Benton, No. PES-15-299010 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Nov. 
18, 2016) [hereinafter Hefti Declaration] (“Brandenburger & Davis maintains . . . an extensive 
network of . . . reporters throughout the United States . . . .”). 
219 Missing Heir Probate Reporters An Introduction, W.C. COX & CO., http://www.wccox.com/
reporter.html [https://perma.cc/4V9Z-3XX7]. 
220 See, e.g., Declaration of Lee Cox in Support of Partial Assignment of Ints. to W.C. Cox & 
Co. at 3, In re Est. of Nocerini, No. PES-16-300036 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 27, 2019) [hereinafter 
Cox Declaration] (describing a search using “in-house microfilm”). 
221 Hefti Declaration, supra note 218, at 2. 
222 About the Company, supra note 89. 
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History Library in Salt Lake City, Utah, which is “the most extensive 
genealogical repository in the United States.”223 
After companies have identified an heir, they follow the same script. 
Either in person, over the phone, or by letter, heir hunters break the ice by 
telling prospects that they “ha[ve] located money to which we believe you are 
entitled.”224 From there, firms offer to “fully disclose the nature and amount 
of the claim” once the heir agrees to assign a share of her inheritance in 
return.225 The amount shared with the heir hunter ranges from ten to forty 
percent depending on where the heir lives and the anticipated difficulty of 
establishing her entitlement to the estate.226 Overall, both the mean and 
median amount of the assignments in our data is twenty percent of the heir’s 
inheritance.227 Finally, some heir hunters emphasize the need to “act 
immediately,”228 urging potential clients to sign the contract “as soon as possible.”229 
The assignments are short and simple. Heir hunters start with a 
preprinted form that recites that the heir is assigning a set percentage of her 
inheritance “in consideration of [the firm’s] . . . services rendered in 
informing me of my interest in a pending estate, and for its efforts and 
expense on my behalf in investigating and obtaining the necessary proof to 
support my claim.”230 The contract then clarifies that the heir owes nothing 
to the heir hunter and “if there is no recovery, there will be no charge of any 
kind.”231 Finally, the company fills in blanks on the template with the names 
of the heir and the estate, and both parties sign at the bottom.232 Figure 6, 
which depicts an ARB agreement, and Figure 7, which is a contract from 




223 Hefti Declaration, supra note 218, at 2. 
224 See, e.g., Kelly Declaration, supra note 23, at 8 (reprinting a hand-delivered letter from heir 
hunter); Imperial Declaration, supra note 4, at 2 (describing a phone call from an heir hunter to two 
prospects informing them that they might be entitled to a beneficial interest in an estate). 
225 Kelly Declaration, supra note 23, at 8. 
226 See, e.g., Cox Declaration, supra note 220, at 2 (“This fee is usually determined by the size 
of the estate, the amount of time and expense involved in locating the interested parties and the 
overall risk of success in resolving the matter on behalf of the heir(s).”); Agreements & Assignments 
to Fraser & Fraser at 2, In re Est. of Franco, No. PES-16-299825 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 1, 2018) 
(containing an assignment of forty percent). 
227 We base these calculations on 205 contracts, excluding eleven that are in a foreign language, 
two that do not appear in the probate files, and one in which the percentage is illegible. 
228 Imperial Declaration, supra note 4, at 2. 
229 Kelly Declaration, supra note 23, at 8. 
230 Final Rep. of Adm’r on Waiver of Acct.; Petition for Approval of Rep.; for Award of 
Statutory Att’ys[’] Fees and Extraordinary Att’ys[’] Fees; & for Final Distrib. at 8, In re Est. of 
Palacpac, No. PES-14-297716 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 20, 2017). 
231 Id. (capitalization omitted). 
232 Id. 
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Heir hunters sometimes need to establish their clients’ rights by filing an 
heirship petition.233 Nine of the thirty-one estates with heir hunters (29%) 
required such a pleading. Although courts have sometimes complained that 
heir hunters support their petitions with “weak evidence,”234 we did not find 
this to be true. Instead, the heirship petitions in the San Francisco files 
usually include a dazzling variety of proof linking the heirs to the decedent, 
such as birth and death certificates, divorce records, identification cards, 
filings from other probate cases, and a detailed family tree.235 For example, in 
one matter, Brandenburger & Davis produced an obituary from an obscure 
local newspaper, Census entries from 1910 and 1930, a World War I draft 
registration card, and an entry from the Find a Grave website.236 This 
attention to detail paid dividends, because during our research period, the 
San Francisco probate court did not deny a single heirship petition. 
This Part has offered an overview of the heir hunting industry. In the next 
section, we drill down into the data and analyze the jurisdictional split over 
whether and how to regulate the field. 
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This Part uses our findings to make doctrinal recommendations. First, it 
argues that our research both supports and undermines the orthodox 
approach of nullifying heir hunting assignments for champerty. Second, it 
contends that even though heir hunters exert too much power over their 
client’s decisions about legal representation, existing law does not adequately 
address this problem. Finally, we propose legislation that would better 
regulate the industry. 
A. Champerty 
As noted, courts all over the literal map are all over the proverbial map 
when it comes to deciding whether heir hunting contracts violate the 
champerty doctrine.237 This section contends that champerty is a plausible 
but draconian solution to heir hunting’s social costs. 
 
233 See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 11700 (West 2020) (allowing parties to “file a petition for a 
court determination of the persons entitled to distribution of the decedent’s estate”). 
234 Peltner v. Bartsch Herterich (Est. of Bartsch), 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 13, 23 (Ct. App. 2011); see also 
Kemp & Assocs. v. Herzog (Est. of Herzog), 245 Cal. Rptr. 3d 498, 507 (Ct. App. 2019) (affirming trial 
court’s denial of heir hunter’s heirship petition because the company relied on “problematic sources”). 
235 See, e.g., Petition to Determine Those Persons Entitled to Distrib. of Est. at 7-48, In re Est. 
of Spears, No. PES-14-298050 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Oct. 6, 2015) (including birth, death, and 
divorce records and an obituary). 
236 Declaration of Paul Hefti Regading Due Diligence in Locating Maternal Heirs at 2, Est. 
of Johnsson, No PES-15-298936 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 15, 2017). 
237 See supra text accompanying notes 125–35. 
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1. Purposes of Champerty 
Supposedly, champerty prevents heir hunters from causing two different 
kinds of harm: inciting litigation and interfering with the administrator’s 
duty to find the heirs. We discuss each in turn. 
a. The Litigiousness Theory 
Some courts hold that heir hunting contracts are champertous because 
they fan the flames of probate litigation.238 Although this view has fallen from 
favor over the last half-century,239 we discover surprisingly strong support for it. 
We start by defining “litigation.” Generally, a telltale sign of litigation is 
that parties find themselves in court. However, because probate is an 
inherently court-based process, we cannot rely on that benchmark. 
Compounding this problem, parties in probate routinely file petitions asking 
the court to perform some action, such as approving the sale of real property240 
or ordering a preliminary distribution of assets to the beneficiaries.241 These 
filings are quasi-adversarial: even if nobody opposes them, the petitioner must 
persuade the court through arguments and evidence to grant the requested 
relief.242 Nevertheless, we decided not to count quasi-adversarial petitions as 
“litigation.” Instead, we classified an estate as “litigated” only if a stakeholder 
objected to another party’s petition. Unlike quasi-adversarial matters, which 
sometimes sail through the system, formal objections inevitably require 
extensive briefing and oral argument. Therefore, they are more consistent with 
how we think of “litigation” in other spheres. 
Even under this narrow definition, the connection between heir hunting 
and litigation in our data is undeniable. A whopping fourteen of the thirty-
one estates that featured heir hunters (45.2%) degenerated into litigation. In 
sharp contrast, just 141 of the 1,318 other matters (10.7%) were litigated, which 




238 See, e.g., In re Atkinson’s Est., 20 Pa. D. & C.3d 700, 712 (C.P. Phila. Cnty., Orphans’ Ct. 
Div. 1981), aff ’d sub nom. Est. of Atkinson, 468 A.2d 841 (Pa. Super Ct. 1983) (noting that heir 
hunting assignments consider litigation, which is a common element of champertous contracts); see 
also supra text accompanying note 104. 
239 See supra text accompanying notes 127–29. 
240 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 10309 (West 2020) (establishing criteria for court confirmation of 
the sale of land). 
241 See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 11620, 11621(a) (West 2020) (empowering courts to distribute 
some of the decedent’s property before the case closes “if at the hearing it appears that the 
distribution may be made without loss to creditors or injury to the estate or any interested person”). 
242 See David Horton, In Partial Defense of Probate: Evidence from Alameda County, California, 103 
GEO. L.J. 605, 634 (2015) (noting the phenomenon of judges refusing to grant unopposed petitions). 
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Table 3: Litigation 
Estate Type N 
Percent of Estates 
with Disputes† 
Heir Hunters 31 45.2%*** 
Other Estates 1,318 
10.7% 
(p = 0.000) 
Total 1,349 11.5% 
Notes: 
(1) † Z-tests compare lawyer-drafted wills with each kind of DIY will. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
To look closer, we conducted a regression analysis that used litigation as 
the dependent variable and also examined various factors that might generate 
conflict. First, because self-made wills “are notoriously prone to challenge,”243 
we included independent variables for instruments that were (1) homemade 
and witnessed, (2) holographic,244 (3) fill-in-the-blank forms, or (4) produced 
with software.245 Second, to probe the link between dispositive choices and 
conflict, we coded estates as featuring either (1) intestate decedents, (2) 
testators who left assets proportionately to similarly-situated relatives (such 
as “to my three children equally”), (3) testators who favored some group 
members over others (like “two-thirds to my daughter and one-third to my 
son”), and (4) “pour over” wills (which leave the estate to a trust).246 Finally, 
we examined the impact of (1) creditors filing claims against the estate, (2) 
the decedent’s gender, (3) the decedent’s marital status at death, (4) whether 
an heir or beneficiary took out a probate loan,247 (5) the value of the estate, 
and (6) whether the decedent owned land. 
 
243 Richard Lewis Brown, The Holograph Problem—The Case Against Holographic Wills, 74 TENN. 
L. REV. 93, 100 (2006). 
244 Holographic wills do not need to be signed by witnesses, but must be largely in the 
testator’s handwriting. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6111 (West 2020). 
245 Self-help legal service providers like Nolo Press and LegalZoom sell popular will-making 
software. See QuickenWillMaker & Trust 2021, NOLO, https://store.nolo.com/products/quicken-
willmaker-plus-wqp.html [https://perma.cc/B8Z2-KL5N]; Last Will and Testament, LEGALZOOM, 
https://www.legalzoom.com/personal/estate-planning/last-will-and-testament-overview.html 
[https://perma.cc/9M79-W2F6]. 
246 A pour over will ensures that any property that the decedent failed to convey to the trust 
during her life passes under its terms after she dies. David Horton, Tomorrow’s Inheritance: The 
Frontiers of Estate Planning Formalism, 58 B.C. L. REV. 539, 581 (2017). 
247 As noted above, a probate loan occurs when a beneficiary sells part of her expected 
inheritance to a company. See Horton & Chandrasekher, supra note 51, at 167. 
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As Table 4 reveals, even with these additional controls, the mere fact that 
an estate involves an heir hunter is correlated with a 721% increase in the odds 
of litigation (p < 0.001). The association between heir hunters and probate 
conflict is more extreme than other attributes that seem to spawn disputes. 
Specifically, (1) homemade and attested wills increase the odds of litigation 
289% relative to lawyer-drafted instruments (p < 0.05), (2) testators who leave 
assets unequally to similarly-situated family members see a 217% uptick in the 
odds of litigation when contrasted with testators who give the same amount 
to each class of relatives (p < 0.05), (3) creditor’s claims increase the odds of 
litigation by 217% (p < 0.001) compared to estates without debt, and (4) 
probate loans are associated with a 505% jump in the odds of litigation versus 
matters in which no heir or beneficiary borrows against their future 
inheritance. These results appear to substantiate the first wave of heir hunting 
cases, which applied the champerty doctrine to prevent heir hunters from 
“fomenting . . . litigation.”248 
 











DIY Will Type 
(Reference Category is Lawyer-Drafted Wills) 













248 McIlwain’s Est., 27 Pa. D. & C. 619, 625 (C.P. Phila. Cnty., Orphans’ Ct. Div. 1936); cf. 
Boettcher v. Criscione, 299 P.2d 806, 811 (Kan. 1956), opinion modified on reh’g, 305 P.2d 1055 (Kan. 
1957) (reasoning that the fatal flaw with heir hunting is that “litigation is contemplated” at the time 
of the contract). 

















































(1) The regression samples are smaller than the 
overall sample because some cases are missing 
information. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Four additional points emerge when we take a closer look. First, our data 
slightly exaggerates the frequency of litigation involving heir hunters. Not 
every litigated estate in which an heir hunter appeared was contentious 
because of the heir hunter. Indeed, in four of the fourteen litigated heir hunter 
matters (twenty-nine percent), the conflict was unrelated to the company. For 
instance, one matter featured a challenge to the validity of a will,249 and 
another involved a breach of contract claim brought by the administrator 
against a third party.250 Although these issues have nothing to do with 
assignments of inheritance rights, we cannot exclude them from our statistical 
analyses.251 In this way, we marginally overstate heir hunting’s propensity for 
sparking litigation. 
Second, the received wisdom about why heir hunters generate conflict is 
wrong. Cases applying the litigiousness theory assume that heir hunters cause 
discord because they encourage their clients to file unnecessary heirship 
petitions.252 As we mentioned, heir hunters do indeed file heirship petitions 
in about a third of the proceedings in which they appear.253 Yet none of these 
petitions were contested. By contrast, one of the most common sources of 
friction in the San Francisco files is the amount of the heir hunters’ fees. For 
example, we began the Introduction of this Article by describing the 
experiences of Hal and Robert Imperial, who signed away twenty-five percent 
of their inheritance from their father just three weeks after he died.254 When 
Hal and Robert realized what they had done, they objected to the petition for 
final distribution, arguing that the company pressured them to enter into the 
assignment before the administrator had “any reasonable opportunity to 
locate the decedent’s relatives.”255 The probate court agreed that the proposed 
 
249 See Contest & Grounds of Objection to Prob. of Purported Will at 2-5, Velikanje v. Castillo 
(Est. of Nash), No. PES-16-300045 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Sept. 30, 2016) (providing several reasons 
a court should deny a will, including the decedent’s lack of sound mind and fraudulent signature). 
250 Petition to Establish Est.’s Claim of Ownership to Prop., for Breach of Good Faith & Fair 
Dealing, for Wrongful Taking of Est. Prop. in Bad Faith, & for Ord. Directing Prop. to Est. at 1-2, 
In re Est. of Mikases, No. PES-14-297644 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 8, 2014). 
251 Because “litigation” is a dummy variable, we must code each case as either “0” (no litigation) or “1” 
(litigation). We do not have a third option for estates that involve litigation that is not tied to an heir hunter. 
252 See, e.g., Sprye v. Porter [1856] 119 Eng. Rep. 1169, 1178; 7 El. & Bl. 57, 80 (reasoning that 
heir hunting is objectionable because the firm agrees to establish that the heirs descend from the 
decedent); In re Atkinson’s Est., 20 Pa. D. & C.3d 700, 712 (C.P. Phila. Cnty., Orphans’ Ct. Div. 
1981), aff ’d sub nom. Est. of Atkinson, 468 A.2d 841 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (explaining that an 
assignment was for the purpose of “assistance in contemplated litigation, the common element of 
champertous contracts” and that “[t]he contingent nature of the heir-hunter’s compensation suggests 
that the genealogist intended to take all steps necessary to the heir’s recovery”). 
253 See supra text accompanying notes 233–34. 
254 See supra text accompanying notes 1–13. 
255 Objection to First & Final Acct. & Rep. of Status of Admin. of the S.F. Pub. Adm’r, as 
Adm’r of the Est. & Petition for Settlement Thereof; for Allowance of Statutory Att’y’s & Adm’r’s 
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fees were “grossly unreasonable” and entered a handwritten reduction of the 
fees from twenty-five percent to ten percent.256 
 






Third, the ubiquity of fee disputes also means that we underreport the 
frequency of heir hunter-generated conflict. Our conservative definition of 
“litigation” excludes three cases in which the court announced that it was 
considering reducing an heir hunter’s compensation under section 11604 and 
invited the company to respond. Because these were judge-initiated 
proceedings, no party filed an objection, and they do not qualify as “litigated” 
in our analysis. Yet firms acted as though they were litigating by trying to 
justify their fees through extensive briefing.257 
 
Comp.; for Cal. Prob. Code § 7621(d) Bond Fee; & for Final Distrib. at 5, In re Est. of Imperial, 
No. PES-16-299740 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 12, 2018). 
256 Imperial, Order for Final Distribution, supra note 2, at 3. Likewise, in Estate of Poston—the 
second case we mentioned in the Introduction, in which Laurie Montoya alleged that TES tricked her 
into assigning a share of her mother’s estate—the administrator challenged the propriety of the 
company’s fees on Montoya’s behalf. See Petition for Preliminary Distrib., and for Allowance on Acct. 
of Comp. to Att’y at 9-10, In re Est. of Poston, No. PES-16-299983 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 29, 2017) 
(asking “the court [to] inquire into the consideration for this assignment”); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 14–29 (detailing the administration of the Poston estate and the circumstances that 
led to the collection of twenty-nine percent of Montoya’s inheritance). The court did so and held that 
the firm’s private investigator, Ed Kelly, had located Montoya with relatively little effort: 
Mr. Kelly was able to find Ms. Montoya within the course of a day by going to her 
former residential hotel address in San Francisco and inquiring if anyone knew her 
whereabouts. An unidentified person provided Mr. Kelly with a valid phone number 
to the residential hotel where Ms. Montoya was living, located a few b[l]ocks away 
from her previous address. Mr. Kelly states in his declaration that he was able to meet 
with Ms. Montoya the same day, and obtained her signature on the assignment 
documents.	.	.	.	[T]he Court estimates that between 15 and 20 hours were spent 
locating Ms. Montoya	.	.	.	. 
Statement of Decision at 9-10, In re Est. of Poston, No. PES-16-299983 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 
25, 2018). Accordingly, the court held that TES’ fee was “grossly unreasonable,” and reduced the 
assignment from 29% to 18%. Id. at 16. 
257 See, e.g., W.C. Cox & Co., Assignee of Heir’s [sic], Brief in Support of Final Rep. of Adm’r 
on Waiver of Acct.; Petition for Approval of Repo.; for Award of Statutory Att’y Fees & 
Extraordinary Att’y Fees; & for Final Distrib. at 2-5, In re Est. of Palacpac, No. PES-14-297716 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. filed May 31, 2017) (defending W.C Cox’s attempt to collect a fee of over $160,000); 
Declaration of Ehlanie Palacpac in Support of Payment of Partial Assignment of Ints. at 2, In re Est. 
of Palacpac, No. PES-14-297716 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 25, 2017) [hereinafter Ehlanie Palacpac 
Declaration] (same); Cox Palacpac Declaration, supra note 216, at 3 (same). 
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Fourth, we admit that the correlation between heir hunters and litigation 
may be weaker outside of California. Section 11604 facilitates challenges to 
heir hunting assignments by conferring the administrator or any “interested 
person” with standing to demand a fairness inquiry.258 Likewise, as noted 
above, it permits the probate judge to raise this issue on its own motion.259 
Since only New York has a comparable law,260 and because section 11604 is a 
wellspring of litigation, further research is necessary to determine whether 
heir hunters have the same impact in other jurisdictions. 
In sum, the litigiousness theory of the champerty doctrine is well 
supported by our data. In the next section, we examine its cousin: the 
interference theory. 
b. The Interference Theory 
Other judges have embraced the interference view of champerty. They 
reason that heir hunters “compete with duly appointed [a]dministrators” by 
swooping in and “finding” the decedent’s close relatives immediately after the 
probate case opens.261 As one court quipped, these are not heir hunters; 
rather, they are “heir-chasers.”262 
Our data renders a mixed verdict on whether these aggressive tactics still 
plague the industry. On the bright side, companies are less likely to target the 
decedent’s children, siblings, or parents. Indeed, as Figure 9 showcases, we 
were able to determine the relationships between 195 heirs and the decedent. 
Most were as least as distant as first cousins once removed (grandchildren of 
the decedent’s aunt or uncle). Thus, the “missing” heir scam is not a major 






258 CAL. PROB. CODE § 11604(b) (West 2020). Not every state opens the courthouse door as 
wide for challenges to heir hunting assignments. See, e.g., In re Est. of Campbell, 742 A.2d 639, 641 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1999) (“The administratrix is not a party to those agreements, stands to lose 
nothing from the consummation of those agreements and, thus, does not have standing to complain.”). 
259 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 11604(b) (“The court on its own motion . . . may inquire into the 
circumstances . . . and the amount of any fees, charges, or consideration paid or agreed to be paid 
by the beneficiary.”). 
260 See supra text accompanying notes 120–22. (discussing New York Estates, Power and Trust 
Law § 13.2-3, which allows judges to reduce unreasonable heir hunters’ fees). 
261 In re Est. of Rice, 193 N.E.2d 566, 569 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1963); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 106–07 (noting that beneficiaries who would have normally learned of their 
inheritance in the ordinary course of administration of the estate may now have to pay collection 
fees to heir hunters). 
262 Carey v. Thieme, 64 A.2d 394, 398 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1949). 
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But on the dark side, the timing of heir hunting contracts remains 
problematic. Firms still contact heirs extremely early in the probate matter. 
As Table 5 reveals, an average of about two months pass between the opening 
of a probate case and the execution of an assignment. Even more notably, 
heirs signed a staggering 162 (80%) agreements before the court appointed an 
administrator. Because administrators in those estates never had a chance to 
try to find the decedent’s kin, we cannot determine from our data whether 
the heir hunter provided a valuable service or if discovery of the heirs would 
have been “inevitable.”263 
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263 McIlwain’s Est., 27 Pa. D. & C. 619, 623 (C.P. Phila. Cnty., Orphans’ Ct. Div. 1936). 
264 Nineteen contracts either do not appear in the record or are missing information about 
when the heir signed them. 
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2. Disadvantages of Champerty 
Our research also sounds a note of caution about applying champerty to 
heir hunting. Although heir hunting is flawed, it can also be necessary and 
even laudable. The nuclear option of champerty would destroy heir hunting’s 
social value. 
Despite their self-interest, heir hunters further the public good in two 
ways. First, they have an uncanny ability to detect petitions for letters of 
administration that either fraudulently or accidentally omit heirs. For 
example, in Estate of Palacpac, the decedent’s sister alleged that she was the 
decedent’s sole living kin.265 W.C. Cox discovered that the sister had failed to 
mention the decedent’s daughter, who was entitled to take the entire estate.266 
Likewise, in Estate of Sheldon, Sheila Allen filed a petition for letters of 
administration, claiming that she was the decedent’s “sole heir” and “first 
cousin.”267 However, ARB revealed that Allen was actually the stepchild of 
the decedent’s uncle, and had ignored fourteen other heirs in her petition.268 
Finally, in Estate of Nocerini, W.C. Cox located an heir, David Abraham, who 
was the half-brother of the decedent’s predeceased spouse, Zara Abraham.269 
This was remarkable because nobody in either the decedent’s or Zara’s family 
 
265 Petition for Letters of Admin. at 3-4, Est. of Palacpac, No. PES-14-297716 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
filed May 2, 2014). 
266 Cox Palacpac Declaration, supra note 216, at 3; Ord. for Final Distrib.; Settling First & 
Final Acct.; for Award of Statutory Att’ys’ Fees and Extraordinary Att’y Fees; & for Final Distrib. 
at 3, In re Est. of Palacpac, No. PES-14-297716 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 14, 2017). Estate of O’Brien 
presented nearly identical facts. The decedent’s brother claimed to be the sole “[h]eir [a]t [l]aw.” 
Petition for Letters of Admin. at 4, In re Est. of O’Brien, No. PES-15-299386 (Cal Super. Ct. filed 
Dec. 23, 2015). However, ARB discovered that the decedent’s predeceased sister had left two children, who 
were eligible to inherit. Declaration of Preston Cochrane in Response to Exam’r’s Notes at 2, In re Est. of 
O’Brien, No. PES-15-299386 (Cal Super. Ct. filed Mar. 15, 2017) [hereinafter Cochrane Declaration]. 
267 Petition for Letters of Admin. at 5, In re Est. of Sheldon, No. PES-16-300458 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. filed Dec. 23, 2016). 
268 See Objection to Amended Petition for Letters of Admin. at 2, In re Est. of Sheldon, No. 
PES-16-300458 (Cal Super. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 2017) (“[A]t least 14 maternal heirs had been 
intentionally omitted from the petition . . . .”). Similarly, in Estate of Pait, the petition for letters of 
administration alleged that the decedent was survived by a brother, a half-sister, and two nieces. 
Petition for Letters of Admin. at 9, Est. of Pait, No. PES-14-297612 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 
2014). ARB recognized that this list was incomplete: the decedent also had a nephew, who was 
serving time in California state prison. Declaration Re Assignment to Am. Rsch. Bureau at 1, Est. 
of Pait, No. PES-14-297612 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Sept. 29, 2015) (explaining that the petition for 
letters of administration did not mention the nephew, Robert S. Peet); Ord. Approving First & 
Final Rep. & Acct. of Pers. Representative & Petition for Its Settlement, for Allowance of Comm’n 
to Pers. Representative, Fees to the Att’y, for Payment to Cal. Victims[’] Comp. & Claims Bd. in 
Sum of $1,971.25 from Robert S. Peet’s Share, & for Final Distrib. at 3, Est. of Pait, No. PES-14-
297612 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Nov. 18, 2015) (noting that the nephew is incarcerated). 
269 Declaration of John E. Boessenecker in Support of Partial Assignment of Ints. to W.C. 
Cox & Co. at 2, In re Est. of Nocerini, No. PES-16-300036 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 27, 2019) 
[hereinafter Boessenecker Declaration]. 
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even knew that Zara had a half-brother.270 As David explained, he was “very 
surprised to learn from W.C. Cox & Co. that Zara and I were half siblings.”271 
In cases like these, heir hunters act like fact-checkers, ensuring the accuracy 
of the probate process. 
Second, heir hunters are masters at solving genealogical mysteries. 
Probate judges must try to distribute every matter that lands on their dockets. 
As a result, they often struggle with decedents about whom virtually nothing 
is known. In these cases, the probate system depends on the skills and 
resources of heir hunters.272 Recall the Colson and Menchaca estates, which 
we mentioned in the Introduction.273 If it were not for ERA’s research, these 
matters would still be festering in probate court.274 Likewise, in Estate of 
Borchert, the decedent was an adopted only child who had never married or 
borne children, and had immigrated from Germany in the 1970s.275 The 
Public Administrator interviewed her co-workers, searched her apartment, 
read her mail, contacted the German consulate and police, and entered her 
name into people-finder websites Ancestry.com and Accurint, but could not 
identify her next of kin.276 However, W.C. Cox partnered with a European 
heir hunter and tracked down the decedent’s second cousins.277 These cases 
illustrate what some modern courts have recognized: heir hunting 
“agreements may be beneficial rather than harmful in some cases.”278 
 
270 Id. 
271 Declaration of David Abraham & Consent to Partial Assignment of Int. to W.C. Cox & 
Co. at 2, In re Est. of Nocerini, No. PES-16-300036 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 27, 2019) [hereinafter 
Abraham Declaration]. 
272 In December of 2019, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services proposed a 
500% fee increase for the production of immigration and naturalization records. Harmeet Kaur, The 
Cost of Getting Genealogical Records from the Government Could Go up Nearly 500%. An Effort Is Underway 
to Stop That, CNN (Dec. 30, 2019, 9:28 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/29/us/immigration-records-
uscis-fee-hike-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/B56M-4REC]. The proposal, should it go into effect, 
would likely impact both the supply and demand for heir hunting services. 
273 See supra text accompanying notes 30–38. 
274 Id. 
275 Declaration of Due Diligence at 2, In re Est. of Borchert, No. PES-16-299918 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. filed June 22, 2016). 
276 Id. at 2-3. 
277 See Notice of Partial Assignment of Ints. in Est. at 1, In re Est. of Borchert, No. PES-16-
299918 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 11, 2019); S.F. Pub. Adm’r’s Rep. of Status of Admin.; Petition for 
Approval Thereof; & Request for Extension of Time to Administer Est. at 3, In re Est. of Borchert, 
No. PES-16-299918 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Nov. 15, 2019). 
278 Nelson v. McGoldrick, 896 P.2d 1258, 1266 (Wash. 1995); see also Haven Sav. Bank v. 
Zanolini, 3 A.3d 608, 623-24 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (“[T]he public has an interest in 
allowing companies to assist individuals in recovering property to which they are entitled but of 
which they might not be aware . . . .”); cf. Friedman, supra note 51, at 111 (“A statutory abolition of 
the heir-hunting profession could result in the unnecessary escheat of funds that the rightful heir 
would otherwise recover.”). In fact, in two matters in the San Francisco files, the administrator chose 
to hire an heir hunter to help her carry out her duties. See Declaration of Due Diligence by Cathy 
Fletcher, Senior Researcher for Int’l Genealogical Search, Inc. at 2, In re Est. of Franco, No. PES-
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In turn, heir hunting’s silver linings tip the scales against applying 
champerty in this sphere. The doctrine would likely cripple the industry and 
thus make probate less efficient. For example, the litigiousness theory 
nullifies contracts for services “to be rendered in the enforcement of [the 
heir’s] claim.”279 To bend to this rule, companies would need to sell heirs 
information about a pending inheritance and then disengage, leaving it up to 
individual heirs to assert their rights.280 It is not clear that this approach 
would be sustainable. Likewise, the interference view generates uncertainty. 
Firms would have little incentive to incur such hefty sunk costs—monitoring 
probate files, performing genealogical research, contacting clients, 
marshalling evidence—if a judge might find that they usurped the 
administrator’s role and therefore bar them from collecting. These 
considerations should give courts pause about using champerty to regulate 
heir hunting.281 
B. Representation 
Heir hunters’ influence over their clients’ legal representation has long 
been a cause for concern. This section uses our data to show that these dangers 
are real. Yet it also urges the law to move beyond its current approach of 
invoking ethical rules to strike down heir hunting assignments on a case-by-
case basis. 
The phenomenon of heir hunters hiring counsel for heirs is troubling for 
two reasons. First, some states extend the rule against the unauthorized 
practice of law to preclude non-lawyers from touting the services of particular 
attorneys.282 The logic behind banning “running and capping” is that it is 
unethical for attorneys to drum up business by soliciting clients, so third 
parties should not be able to solicit clients for attorneys.283 Thus, when heir 
 
16-299825 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 15, 2016); Ex Parte Petition for Auth. to Retain Finders Int’l at 
1, Est. of Borchert, No. PES-16-299918 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Aug. 22, 2018). 
279 McIlwain’s Est., 27 Pa. D. & C. 619, 623 (C.P. Phila. Cnty., Orphans’ Ct. Div. 1936). 
280 See, e.g., Wedgerfield v. De Bernardy [1908] 24 TLR 497, 497-98 (Eng.) (upholding an heir 
hunting contract when there was no evidence that the firm was going to assist the heirs in probate court). 
281 Another issue also compounds the potential for unfairness to heir hunters. Traditionally, 
once a court had invalidated an assignment, it would also deny the company restitution for the 
reasonable value of its services. See, e.g., Landi v. Arkules, 835 P.2d 458, 468 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) 
(“[E]quitable relief is not available when recovery at law is forbidden because the contract is void as 
against public policy.”); McIlwain’s Est., 27 Pa. D. & C. at 623 (“No compensation can be awarded 
for services actually rendered, because if there be champerty, no recovery can be had.”). But see In re 
Atkinson’s Est., 20 Pa. D. & C.3d 700, 728 (C.P. Phila. Cnty., Orphans’ Ct. Div. 1981), aff ’d sub nom. 
Est. of Atkinson, 468 A.2d 841 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (refusing to “deprive [the heir hunter] of any 
remuneration.”). Thus, in a jurisdiction that recognizes champerty, a firm faces the realistic 
possibility of performing a significant amount of work and yet recovering nothing. 
282 See supra text accompanying notes 114–15. 
283 Id. 
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hunters funnel heirs to particular counsel, they violate this maxim.284 Second, 
dual representation does not serve heirs well. The goals of the heir hunter 
and the heir are diametrically opposed concerning the reasonableness of the 
heir hunting fees. Making matters worse, any rational self-interested attorney 
would resolve this tug-of-war in favor of the heir hunter. After all, to the 
lawyer, heir hunting clients are repeat players who can be a lucrative source 
of revenue, but heirs are one-time clients who are unlikely to return with 
future business.285 Furthermore, since an attorney’s “own compensation 
hinges on the validity of the contract between [the company] and putative 
heirs, it can scarcely be anticipated that counsel . . . would question the 
validity of the contract.”286 
But despite decades of cases that try to ensure that heirs have access to 
neutral counsel, our research reveals that heir hunters continue to control 
heirs’ decisions about legal representation. As one company admitted in a 
declaration, it gives heirs “the choice of having the heir locator’s attorney 
represent him or her, at the heir locator’s expense, or engaging his or her own 
legal counsel, and the heir’s own expense.”287 Understandably, many heirs opt 
to freeride rather than pay for their own attorney. Yet they likely do not 
realize that there is a severe conflict of interest. 
Some heir hunters have even developed boilerplate forms for heirs to 
consent to dual legal representation. For instance, in one case, ARB 
inadvertently filed identical letters that six heirs had supposedly sent to 
ARB’s attorney requesting that he represent them: 
I understand that your firm represents the American Research Bureau, 
to which I have made an Assignment of Partial Interest in the Estate 
of Bernard Manuel Cleland, and that office has agreed to pay for your 
services in representing its interest as assignee in this matter. I am 
informed that insofar as there is no conflict of interest, you are willing 
to represent me	.	.	.	solely for the purpose of establishing my right to 
inherit and in obtaining distribution for the benefit of the American 
 
284 Indeed, as a Florida ethics commission determined, “[i]t is improper for an attorney to 
allow an heir-hunt[er] to advise potential heirs of his service” because “a lawyer cannot solicit and 
therefore cannot let others solicit for him.” Florida State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Pro. Ethics, Op. 77-
8 (1977); see also O’Grady v. Boldt (Est. of Molino), 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 512, 518 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(remarking that it is “unlawful for person to . . . solicit business for an attorney”). 
285 See generally Marc Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (analyzing the advantages enjoyed by parties who 
frequently participate in the legal system). 
286 In re Atkinson’s Est., 20 Pa. D. & C.3d at 721. 
287 Boessenecker Declaration, supra note 269, at 2. 
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Research Bureau and me, without making any charge to me for that 
service.288 
The cookie-cutter language in each of the letters removes any doubt that 
ARB—and not the heirs—wrote them. In turn, this suggests that heir hunters 
have a well-oiled machine that pushes heirs toward the heir hunters’ own lawyer. 
Finally, we discovered that heir hunters have a new trick up their sleeves. 
Several cases did not seem at first blush to feature dual representation because 
the company and its clients had different counsel. But upon closer inspection, 
the supposedly independent attorney representing the heirs turned out to be 
someone who routinely worked for the heir hunter in other matters. We call 
these “industry lawyers.” 
The widespread use of industry lawyers is a blatant attempt to evade rules 
that prohibit dual representation.289 On paper, the heir and the heir hunter 
are represented by different attorneys. In reality, though, industry lawyers 
raise the same “insurmountable conflict of interest” as dual representation.290 
For one, although evidence about who is paying the heirs’ counsel is rarely 
visible in the court files, it is all but certain that the heir hunter is picking up 
the tab. In addition, as mentioned above, industry lawyers have strong 
financial incentives to favor their loyal corporate clients over individuals who 
are unlikely to appear in probate court again.291 
This problem comes to the fore in estates with disputes over heir hunters’ 
fees. In one such matter, the heir was also represented by the company’s 
counsel, and in two other cases, the heirs hired industry lawyers. However, in 
all three proceedings, the heirs took the paradoxical step of filing pleadings 
in support of the heir hunter.292 For example, in Estate of Pait, ARB located 
Robert Peet, the decedent’s nephew, twenty-three days after the estate 
opened and a month before the court granted letters to the administrator.293 
 
288 Declaration of Thomas W. Cain Regarding Authorization from Heirs at 3, Est. of Cleland, 
No. PES-15-298545 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 26, 2017). 
289 See Gunning v. Caudill (Est. of Wright), 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 572, 578 (Ct. App. 2001) 
(suggesting that dual representation can void an assignment); Sullivan v. Comm. on Admissions & 
Grievances of the U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 395 F.2d 954, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“[T]he first obligation 
of a lawyer acting truly and wholly in the interests of the heir might well be to advise his heir-
client . . . that the contingent fee contract between the ‘heir finder’ and the heir was void . . . .”); In 
re Est. of Campbell, 742 A.2d 639, 642 n.5 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1999) (“The interests of the 
genealogical firm and the heirs . . . are not aligned . . . .”). 
290 Est. of Wright, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 578. 
291 See supra text accompanying notes 285–86. 
292 Declaration of Robert S. Peet Re Assignment to Am. Rsch. Bureau at 1-2, Est. of Pait, No. 
PES-14-297612 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Oct. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Pait Declaration]; Ehlanie Palacpac 
Declaration, supra note 257, at 2; Abraham Declaration, supra note 271, at 2. 
293 To be fair to ARB, we should reiterate a fact we mentioned above: the administrator did 
not list Peet on his petition for letters of administration, perhaps because Peet was incarcerated. See 
supra text accompanying note 268. 
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Although ARB seemed to have little difficulty finding Peet, he assigned 
thirty-three percent of his inheritance to the company.294 In addition, Peet 
agreed to be represented by counsel who appeared on ARB’s behalf in other 
matters.295 When the administrator moved for final distribution, the probate 
judge exercised his prerogative under section 11604 to question the amount 
of ARB’s fees.296 Acting against his own interest, Peet submitted a 
memorandum of points and authorities297 and an affidavit urging the court to 
enforce the assignment as written: 
I willingly entered into a relationship with ARB. . . . I confirm that 
ARB has performed the necessary investigation to identify and locate 
me and to prove me as an heir in connection with the above-referenced 
estate. Without their investigation and identification of my 
whereabouts, I would be an omitted heir in this matter. . . . I have 
assigned a one-third interest [of my share] to ARB, and . . . this is fair 
and reasonable. . . . I confirm that the fee agreement and assignment 
were obtained without any duress, fraud, or undue influence.298 
Apparently, the court was persuaded, because it did not reduce ARB’s 
fee.299 Cases like Pait demonstrate that there is no meaningful distinction 
between dual representation and the use of industry lawyers. In both 
situations, heir hunting firms reap the benefits of being able to cherry-pick 
counsel for heirs. 
These findings suggest that the law does not go far enough to prevent heir 
hunters from exploiting their dominion over heirs’ counsel-selection 
decisions. First, the prohibitions on running and capping and dual 
representation hinge on information that is rarely available in the probate 
record. We scrutinized every pleading and proof of service in our dataset and 
 
294 Assignment of Robert S. Peet in the Est. of Walter Francis Pait, aka Walter Francis Peet, 
Deceased at 2, Est. of Pait, No. PES-14-297612 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed June 29, 2015). 
295 Compare Pait Declaration, supra note 292, at 1 (naming Pait’s lawyer as Douglas B. Bohne), 
with Assignments of Int. in the Est. of Louise Starks, Deceased at 1, Est. of Starks, No. PES-15-
29897 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 31, 2017) (listing Pait’s lawyer, Douglas B. Bohne, as representing 
both ARB and six individual heirs). 
296 See Declaration of Douglas B. Bohne at 1 (acknowledging that the judge’s staff had 
requested more information about ARB’s fees). 
297 Memorandum of Points & Auths. Re Assignment to Am. Rsch. Bureau at 2, Est. of Pait, 
No. PES-14-297612 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Sept. 29, 2015) (“Here, there is no doubt that the 
consideration for the assignment made to ARB is just, equitable, and extremely reasonable.”). 
298 Pait Declaration, supra note 292, at 1-2. 
299 Ord. Approving First & Final Rep. & Acct. of Pers. Representative & Petition for Its 
Settlement, for Allowance of Commi’n to Pers. Representative, Fees to the Att’y, for Payment to 
Cal. Victims [sic] Comp. & Claims Bd. in Sum of $1,971.25 from Robert S. Peet’s Share, & for Final 
Distrib. at 3, Est. of Pait, No. PES-14-297612 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Nov. 18, 2015) (distributing 
ARB’s entire one-third share to the company). 
434 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 169: 383 
could only identify forty-five of 205 heirs’ attorneys (22%). In addition, other 
than the stray pleadings we mentioned above,300 we could not tell why heirs 
had chosen to hire specific attorneys or who was responsible for paying their 
bills. If we cannot detect improper solicitation or conflicts of interest from 
our comprehensive review of the probate record, then neither can the court. 
Second, the limited data we do have indicates that these flaws are endemic. 
As Table 6 showcases, thirty-nine of the forty-five heirs (87%) whose 
representational status is apparent either hired the heir hunters’ counsel or 
industry lawyers. But despite the prevalence of these objectionable 
arrangements, no heir in our dataset raised an ethical challenge to an assignment, 
and no court inquired into these issues on its own under section 11604. 
 




Heir Hunter’s Lawyer 8 
Industry Lawyer 31 
Own Lawyer 4 
Pro Se 1 
Total 205 
 
Accordingly, the existing legal infrastructure does not adequately address 
the systemic ethical issues that heir hunting raises. Thus, in the next section, 
we prescribe stronger medicine. 
C. Legislation 
Rather than using the blunderbuss champerty doctrine or toothless ethical 
rules, jurisdictions should regulate heir hunting by statute.302 This legislation 
should have two components: a limit on heir hunting fees and a ban on heir 
hunting solicitations until the administrator has had a reasonable opportunity 
to find the decedent’s kin. 
 
300 See supra text accompanying notes 288, 292–98. 
301 We were unable to collect any information about fourteen heirs. 
302 We are not targeting federal lawmakers or agencies because probate has “traditionally 
[been] left to state regulation.” Hayduk v. Burke (In re Burke), 592 B.R. 834, 840 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 
2018); cf. Popp, supra note 44, at 749-50 (arguing that the CFPB should pass rules governing 
litigation funding). 
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1. Fee Caps 
Lawmakers should begin by capping heir hunters’ fees, a measure that 
would extend an existing protection in many states for beneficiaries of 
unclaimed property. To determine the statutory maximum, states could 
borrow the analogous fee limitations established by their unclaimed property 
statutes, which tend to be about ten percent of the value of the assets.303 
Fee caps are a simple and effective way to prevent heir hunters from 
overcharging heirs. Our research confirms that heir hunters’ compensation is 
almost always excessive given the amount of work performed. To make this 
point concrete, compare fees paid to personal representatives and their 
attorneys—parties who are intimately involved in every step of the probate 
process. California law entitles these individuals to “ordinary” fees in an 
amount that is linked to the value of the estate304 and additional 
“extraordinary” fees in the court’s discretion for labor-intensive cases, such as 
those that are litigated.305 As Table 7 reveals, the mean amount per matter of 
all of these fees combined—both personal representatives and attorneys and 
both ordinary and extraordinary fees—is $29,522.306 Yet the average heir 
hunter’s recovery per case is $58,696,307 or nearly twice that amount. This 
discrepancy is particular unfair in light of the fact that the estate pays 
administrators and their lawyers, in part, for their efforts to find the 
decedent’s heirs. Thus, in cases with heir hunters, the heirs essentially pay 









303 See supra text accompanying note 163. 
304 See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 10800(a), 10810(a) (West 2020) (setting these fees at 4% of the 
first $100,000, 3% on the next $100,000, 2% on the next $800,000, 1% on the next $9,000,000, 0.5% on 
the next $15,000,000, and then a reasonable sum determined by the court for estates worth more 
than $25,000,000). 
305 See CAL. PROB. CODE § 10801(a) (“[T]he court may allow additional compensation for 
extraordinary services by the personal representative in an amount the court determines is just and 
reasonable.”); see also CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 10811(a) (“[T]he court may allow additional compensation 
for extraordinary services by the attorney for the personal representative in an amount the court 
determines is just and reasonable.”). 
306 In intestacies—the type of probate matter in which heir hunters generally appear—the 
average combined administrator and attorneys’ fees are even lower: $26,759. 
307 If we include the one estate in which the heir hunter recovered nothing, the mean amount 
of heir hunters’ fees per case is $56,522. 
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$39,206 $1,432 $216,239 26309 
 
Moreover, heir hunters’ attempts to justify their fees are not persuasive. 
In the San Francisco files, they repeatedly refused to prove the reasonableness 
of their fees with supporting documentation, such as time sheets or billing 
records.310 Instead, they likened themselves to contingency fee lawyers, who 
collect a substantial portion of their clients’ winnings in return for assuming 
the risk of performing uncompensated work on unsuccessful cases: 
[We begin] the task of locating unknown heirs completely at [our] own 
risk and expense. The results are often disappointing, time consuming 
and costly.	.	.	.	Even when a potential estate with unknown/missing 
heirs is found, it is possible that after incurring costs of locating heirs, 
a will may surface, or the estate may have little or no value due to 
debts or liens on the estate’s assets.311 
 
308 285 estates are missing data on administrator and attorneys’ fees, because the court did not 
enter an order of final distribution. 
309 Four cases involving heir hunters are still pending, and in one matter, the heir hunter 
recovered nothing. 
310 See, e.g., Ord. for Final Distrib.; Settling First & Final Rep. of Status of Admin. & Petition 
for Settlement Thereof; for Approval of Accounting; for Allowance of Att’y’s Comp.; for Allowance 
of Adm’r’s Comp.; & for Reimbursement of Costs Advanced at 7, Est. of O’Brien, No. PES-15-
299386 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 30, 2017) (“ARB was asked to provide documentation to the Court 
to support the assignments being other than grossly unreasonable . . . . ARB was unable to provide 
any documents.”); Ord. for Final Distrib., Settling First & Final Acct. & Rep. of Status of Admin. 
of the S.F. Pub. Adm’r, as Adm’r of the Est., for Allowance of Statutory Att’y’s & Adm’r’s Comp.; 
for Approval of Assignments as Reduced for Cal. Prob. Code §7621(d) Bond Fee (Prob. Code 
§§ 1060, Et Seq., 10800, 10801, 10810, 10811, 12201) at 3, Est. of Lee, No. PES-15-298906 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. filed Nov. 3, 2017) (“The court had questions about the assignments to ARB . . . . [ARB] decided 
not to file anything in support of the amount of the assignments.”). Likewise, as one federal court 
observed, it is telling that heir hunters do not charge “a fee based on the quality and quantity of 
[their] work.” In re Taylor, 216 B.R. 515, 527 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998). 
311 Cox Declaration, supra note 220, at 2. 
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Thus, heir hunters argue, their fees are so high because a small percentage 
of successful cases must subsidize the matters where they earn nothing.312 But 
our data tell a different story. Excluding the four estates that were still 
pending when we performed our data collection, companies recovered on 152 
out of 179 contracts (84.3%). Thus, the danger of non-payment is minimal, 
and heir hunters can offer no convincing rationale for permitting them to 
charge so much. 
Fee caps would also shave off heir hunting’s other rough edges. For one, 
fee restrictions would lower the litigation rate. As noted, disputes over the 
fairness of heir hunters’ compensation are quite common.313 However, a 
bright-line limit on fees would eliminate this fact-sensitive issue from the 
docket. In addition, it would improve upon California and New York’s heir 
hunting statutes by clarifying the amount of a “reasonable” fee up front, 
rather than saddling courts with reviewing each individual assignment after 
the fact.314 Moreover, fee caps would make dual representation and the use of 
 
312 See id. (emphasizing the high financial risk associated with attempting to locate heirs, the 
financial burden on the heir hunters, and the possibility that the heir hunters will earn nothing even 
if heirs are found). 
313 See supra text accompanying notes 252–56. 
314 Policymakers should also adopt language from many unclaimed property statutes that 
clarifies that courts remain free to void heir hunting contracts for defects such as fraud, mistake, or 
duress. See, e.g., REVISED UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROP. ACT § 1302(d) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2016) (“An 
apparent owner . . . may assert that an agreement described in this section is void on a ground other 
than it provides for payment of unconscionable compensation.”); ALA. CODE § 35-12-93(e) (2020) 
(“This section does not preclude an owner from asserting that an agreement covered by this section 
is invalid on grounds other than unconscionable compensation.”); ALASKA STAT. ANN. 
§ 34.45.700(c) (West 2020) (“This section does not preclude an owner from asserting that an 
agreement to locate property is otherwise invalid.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-327(C) (2020) 
(“This section does not prohibit an owner from asserting that an agreement is invalid on grounds 
other than compensation.”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-28-225(e) (West 2020) (“This section does not 
preclude an owner from asserting that an agreement covered by this section is invalid on grounds 
other than unconscionable compensation.”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 523A-25(e) (West 2020) 
(“This section does not preclude an owner from asserting that an agreement covered by this section 
is invalid on grounds other than excessive or unjust compensation.”); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 
1026/15-1302(d) (West 2019) (“An apparent owner or the administrator may assert that an agreement 
described in this Article 13 is void on a ground other than it provides for payment of unconscionable 
compensation.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-34-1-46(c) (West 2020) (“This section does not prevent an 
owner from asserting at any time that an agreement to locate property is otherwise invalid.”); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 556.11(10) (West 2020) (“This section does not prevent an owner from asserting, at 
any time, that an agreement to locate property is based upon excessive or unjust consideration.”); 
LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:177(E) (2019) (“An owner may at any time assert that an agreement covered by 
this Section is otherwise invalid.”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 2201(5) (2019) (“This section 
does not preclude an owner from asserting that an agreement covered by this section is invalid on 
grounds other than unconscionable compensation.”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120A.740(5) (West 
2020) (“This section does not preclude an owner from asserting that an agreement covered by this 
section is invalid on grounds other than that the compensation is more than 10 percent of the total 
value of the property that is the subject of the agreement.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 1265(f) (West 
2020) (“This section does not preclude an owner from asserting that an agreement covered by this 
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industry lawyers less damaging. Even if the heir’s counsel would not question 
the heir hunter’s bill, a court would have little trouble noticing that an heir 
hunter’s fee exceeds a statutorily-prescribed maximum. 
Finally, to assuage concern about dealing a death blow to the industry, 
states could also consider installing a safety valve. Borrowing from the 
existing compensation schemes for personal representatives and attorneys, 
legislatures could allow heir hunters to petition for discretionary awards of 
extraordinary fees.315 This would leave the door open for courts to reward heir 
hunters for truly valuable work, such as detecting heirs who were omitted 
from the petition for letters of administration or solving longstanding 
genealogical puzzles. 
2. Time Limits 
In addition, legislatures should prohibit heir hunting until sixty days after 
the court has appointed an administrator. This “no fly zone” would prevent 
firms from imposing a private tax on unlucky heirs who were going to be 
located anyway.316 
As noted, the administrator must perform a reasonably diligent search for 
the decedent’s kin.317 This process entails “interviewing friends, relatives and 
neighbors, inspecting personal effects, and reviewing motor vehicle, post 
office and voter registration records.”318 To give the administrator the time to 
perform these tasks, lawmakers should ban heir hunting until two months 
after the court grants the petition for letters of administration. Alternatively, 
the period of unenforceability could commence on the date of the decedent’s 
death. A 2011 statute enacted by the Nevada legislature could serve as a 
template for this latter approach; it voids heir hunting contracts entered into 
within ninety days of the decedent’s death.319 
 
section is invalid on grounds other than excessive compensation.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 55.1-2542(B) 
(West 2020) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent an owner from asserting at any 
time that an agreement to locate property is based upon an excessive or unjust consideration.”); cf. 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 345.515 (West 2020) (taking the extra step of preserving heirs’ rights to challenge 
assignments that satisfy the fee cap as nevertheless charging “excessive or unjust consideration”). 
315 See supra text accompanying note 305 (noting the possibility of additional extraordinary fees 
for labor-intensive cases in California). 
316 This would be a probate version of the ban on heir hunting in unclaimed property statutes. 
See supra text accompanying note 161 (noting a ban on heir hunting contracts related to assets that 
have been in state custody for two years or less). 
317 See supra text accompanying note 12. 
318 David N. Adler, Kinship Proceedings Proving the Family Tree, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N J., June 
2005, at 42, 46. 
319 Nevada’s statute states that 
[a]n agreement between an heir finder and an apparent heir, the primary purpose of 
which is to locate, recover or assist in the recovery of an estate for which the public 
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The payoff would be huge. As noted, heir hunters go out of their way to 
secure contracts from heirs before the administrator can even try to find 
them.320 Figure 10, a histogram of the number of days between each heir 
hunting contract and the appointment of the administrator, brings this 
dubious tactic into sharp relief. The vertical red line represents sixty days 
after the appointment—the date by which the administrator should have been 
able to find identifiable heirs. As the skyscraping bars on the left side of this 
line illustrate, 188 of 200 contracts (94%) were consummated before this date. 
Thus, a sixty-day ban would dramatically change heir hunters’ practices, and 
ensure that they only target heirs who are missing, unknown, or intentionally 
omitted from the petition for letters of administration. 
 
















Every year, countless people die without a will or any apparent relatives. 
Thus, for more than a century and a half, heir hunters have injected 
themselves into probate proceedings. Our research provides an empirical 
account of the heir hunting market. In a three-year sample of 1,349 estates 
 
administrator or person employed or contracted with pursuant to NRS 253.125, as 
applicable, has petitioned for letters of administration, is void and unenforceable if 
the agreement is entered into during the period beginning with the death of the person 
whose estate is in probate until 90 days thereafter. Upon a showing of good cause, the 
court may extend such a period until 180 days after the death of the person. 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139.135(1). 
320 See supra text accompanying note 261 (noting an instance of administrators seeking to 
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probated in San Francisco between January 1, 2014 and December 31, 2016, 
we identified 676 intestacies that contained a total of 219 heir hunting 
contracts. In 152 of those contracts, heir hunters recovered an inheritance 
assignment that, on average, assessed fees of $10,107 per agreement. Our 
analysis found that estates containing heir hunting contracts were correlated 
with a 721% increase in the probability of litigation and that those disputes 
often involved the reasonableness or amount of the heir hunter’s fee. Our 
data also revealed that most heir hunting contracts were consummated within 
sixty days of an application for probate, the period during which heirs were 
otherwise likely to receive notice from the estate’s administrator without 
having to pay for an heir hunting service. 
Thus, although courts have become increasingly sanguine about enforcing 
heir hunting agreements because they perform a valuable service in some 
estates, our research demonstrates that the industry needs to be regulated 
more stringently. By restricting fees and prohibiting heir hunting during the 
initial stages of probate, lawmakers could limit the practice’s costs without 
sacrificing its benefits. 
